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ARGUMENTS
POINT I
APPELLEE'S FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UTAH RULES Of APPELLATE
PROCEDURE RULES 24. 26. AND 27.
On May 13, 2009 an Order from the Utah Appellate Courtwas mailed to the Appellant
and the Appellee's because Appellee's failed to submit the electronic courtesy brief to both the
Utah Appellate Court and also to the Appellant. In addition to this Appellee's error, Appellee
also filed with the Utah Appellate Court their response briefs bound with a spiral binding when
the U.R.A.P. Rules specifically require a Velio binding.
Appellee's counsels have been Officer's of the Court for several years, and should be
held to the highest standards governing this Office. Pursuant to UR.A.P. Rule 27, failing to file
and mail the electronic brief is considered untimely and therefore the Appellee's brief should be
rejected. (Attached hereto as Exhibit A, Order).
POINT II
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS ARE MOOT AND WITHOUTMERIT REGARDING
NO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS.
Richard's requested and audio or video transcript through the Recorder's Office,
therefore this argument from the Appellee's is without merit and is moot. (See Exhibit A, and B,
Appellant's Brief). Once again the Appellee's are trying to confuse the issues of the Court
through smoke and mirrors just as they have throughout all of the proceedings. There is no audio
or video to support issues and facts of the case of Summary Judgment in the amount of
$53,656.58, (see Point V, infra.) which was the Summary Judgment which later became the
basis for Attorney's Fees of $23,274.33. Richard's can only base the relevant facts of the case
4

from memory of Law and Motion in the court of Judge Stephen Henroid on April 14, 2008.
Pursuant to Utah R. of Appellate Procedure Rule 54(a), Sufficiency of Evidence
Supporting Findings or Conclusion; where an appellant intends to challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting finding of conclusion, "the appellant must include in the record of the
transcript, of all evidence relevant to the challenged finding or conclusion", as in the cases of
Child vs. Child UT Sup. Ct. No. 20081044, March 17,2009, and J.G. vs. State of Utah 2008
UT App 439.
POINT III
APPELLEE'S RESPONSE WAS INADEQUATELY BREIFED.
Appellee's filed a brief where over eighty percent of their case law did not support
their arguments. Appellee's cited over fifty percent of their cases which represented criminal
procedure instead of civil procedure and did not represent to the court their representation on
criminal law and how it applies to this civil case. Pursuant to Utah R. Appellate Procedure.
Rule 24(a)(9), "Supreme Court is not a depository in which appealing [parties] may dump
burden of argument and research, State v. Brown 853 P.2d 851, (Utah 1993), (an applicable
criminal case for this civil argument)."[Emphasis added]. This is outside the scope of civil
law unless properly addressed to the court that criminal law does apply in this case. In
addition to this error, the Appellee's Appendix was inadequately cited throughout their brief
by only citing page numbers where many Exhibits within their Appendix contained the same
page numbers. Pursuant to Clovdv. Clovd 2009 UT App 123, (May 7,2009), "To be
properly briefed, an argument must provide reasoned analysis based on legal authority cited,"
Spencer v. Pleasant View City 2003 UT App 379, para. 20, 80 P.3d 546, Wall v. Wall 2009
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UT App 129, (May 14, 2009), therefore, all arguments that have been cited in Appellee's
brief should be disregarded. Attached hereto as Exhibit B, Appellee's cases which were not
applicable to their arguments or cited pursuant civil procedure.
POINT IV
APPLLANT CANNOT PROPERLY ARGUE PROCEEDINGS.
Counsel for Appellant is unable to argue issues presented in front of Judge Henroid's
Court since Counsel was hired on Appeal and was not present at the proceedings in District
Court hearings. In addition, counsel for the Appellant cannot properly argue the issues that
Appellee's present in their Response because their was no transcript available to present any
arguments which could only be presented as heresay by Appellant's counsel and Richard's.
Richard's has only a transcript of the proceedings of the Order signed on 23 October 2008
by Judge Christiansen which were set for decision on Attorney's Fees. This transcript is not a
supporting document, since is it based on a judgment and support for attorney fees in Judge
Henroid Court which Richard's is unable to support his facts and findings without a
transcript.
Richards went though the proper appellate procedures in ordering transcripts to back his
appeal, to no avail, found through the Court Recorders Office there was no audio or video of the
proceedings which supported a $76,930.91 judgment against him.
Based on only hearsay by both parties, and having no audio or video record from the
Court to present a proper appeal for Richard's case, the Court of Appeals should remand this case
back for a new trial pursuant to Utah i?. Civil Procedure Rule 4-201, Record of Proceedings or
pursuant to State v. Ruiz 2009 UT App 121, (May 7,2009), Utah R. App P. 35(c) the court also

6

has the right to make a final disposition of the cause without reargument. (citing a criminal case,
applicable to this civil case).
Appellant's counsel was not present to either hearings so Appellee's argument for
attorney fees is irrelevant pursuant to Jensen v. Jensen 2009 UT App 1, (January 2,2009),
"Attorney fees without entering findings on all of the necessary factors... has the right to be
remanded for reconsideration of adequate findings on the award of attorney fees." Awarding
attorney fees in Richard's case in not applicable without the proper facts and findings of the
which have not been brought forward on appeal because there is no transcript to support the
issues.
POINT V
IMPROPER JURISTICTION AND VENUE.
Appellee's failed to argue this issue which Appellant brought up in their original brief
with no supporting case law. The trial court failed to consider Juristion and Venue by not
adhering to designated rules of procedure with Appellee being a Nevada based corporation and
intertwined a lawsuit in California, therefore not domesticating it in Utah.
In Judge Christiansen's Order against the Appellant there was no recognition of a foreign
judgment, which was not properly registered and domesticated in the State of Utah from a
California Court. Pursuant to Gardiner vs. York, 2006 UT App 496, Case No. 20051162-CA
Gardiner domesticated the case in Utah and then went after York alleging that the transfer of the
warehouse was fraudulent, just as in this case, since the Appellee's did not prevail to the point of
satisfaction in California, they went after the Appellant in a fraudulent manner. Appellee's owed
Richard's $55,000.00, and therefore tried to receive what was owed Richard's to go in their
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favor since they could not get a satisfactory judgment in California.
POINT VI
APPELANT WAS NOT A PROFESSIONAL PRO SE LITIGANT.
Appellee's improperly cited the case of Nelson v. Jacobsen 669 P.2d 1207,1213 (Utah
1983), which is actually in favor and in support of Appellant, "A Layman is entitled to undertake
his own representation, but due to his lack of technical knowledge of law and procedure, he
should be accorded every consideration.. .of a layman's decision to function in a capacity for
which he was not trained..." Not only does this case apply to Appellant and not Appellee's,
Appellant's case of Lundahl v Quinn, 2003 UT 11/4,67 P.3d 1000, sets precedence over id.
Richard's is a. pro se litigant and should have some leniency Lundahl v Qvinn, 2003 UT
11/4,67 P.3d 1000, whereby leniency should be granted when apro se litigant is required or
forced into representing himself in a Court of Law. Richard's filed to protect his interest and
objected to the proceeding and protected his right to appeal these decisions. If Richard's would
have been afforded Due Process this case would not be presented on appeal today.

POINT VII
APPELANT^ CASES STATE PRECEDENCE OVER APPELLEE'S.
Appellee's cases should be stricken, not only for not supporting the issues, raised on
appeal, but for old case law that is not relevant to this case. Appellant's case law set's precedence
to the case law presented by the Appellee's.
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CONCLUSION
This case n^eds to be vacated or just supported by Appellant's brief based on the
inadequately briefed response by Appellee's, and based on the fact that this is a foreign
judgment which has not been domesticated in I Ttah which does not follow the Utah R.of
Civil Procedure regarding proper jurisdiction and venue of these civil proceedings.. Tn the
alternative this case should be reversed and remanded, back for new trial based upon no
transcript available to support Richard's appeal for evidence supportingfindings*facts, and
conclusion of law.
Dated this 26 t h day of May 2009.
Respectfully Submitted.

^ayne ^N^Searle
Attorney for Appellant
Counsel for the Appellant
I certify that on this 26th day of May 2009,1 personally placed a true and correct copy of
the "Appellant's Reply Brief, in a sealed envelope. I further placed the same in the United
States Postal Service and addressed it to the following:
Ronald S. George
Law Offices of Ronald S- George P,A
218WPaxtonAve.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Delano S. Findlay
Attorney at Law
648 East Vine Street, Suite #3
Murray, Utah 84107
Signature
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EXHIBIT A

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
_.

riLED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAY 1 3 2009

00O00

Resource Technics, LLC;
Resource Concepts, LLC;
Ronald S, George; Lynn
P. Heward; N. Enos Heward;
and Interphase Corp.,
Pldiiliir dnd Appellees.

OKDlilR
Appellate Case No, 20080910-CA

Gene M. Richards,
Respondent and Appellant,

Before JudgQs Bench^ Davis, and Mcllugh.
Appellee failed to submit the electronic courtesy brief
required under Otah Supreme Court Standing Order No* 8 within
fourteen days after the filing of the printed brief. Please be
advised that within seven (7) days from the date of this order/
you must submit to the court, a copy of appellee's brief on
compaci: disc in searchabie PDF format or a motion stating good
cause to be excused from complying with Utah Supreme Court
Standing Order No. 8. The courtesy bii^I must be accompanied by
certificate of service.

Dated t h i s

\t

FOR THE

James 7,. Davis^Judge

day of May,

2009,

EXHIBIT B

APPELLEE'S CASE LAW NOT APPLICABLE TO
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED IN RESPONSE BRIEF.
Armstrong v. Department of Employment Security, 834 P.2d 562 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992)
Hart v. Salt lake County Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App 1998)
Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 753, 2002 UT App 109 (Utah App. 2002)
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854 n. 1 (Utah 1992)
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d 1108
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)
Treffv. Hinkley, 2001 UT 50, 26 P.3d 212
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1169 n. 6 (Utah 1988)
ALL OTHER CASE LAW PRESENTED IN APPELLEE'S
RESPONSE
BRIEF
IS
NOT
APPLICABLE
BECAUSE
APPELLANT'S CASE LAW SET'S PRECEEDENCE OVER THE
OLD CASE LAW PRESENTED ON APPEAL IN APPELLEE'S
BRIEF, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF:
Lundahl v. Quinn, 67 P.3d 1000, 2003 UT 11 (Utah 1998) (Utah 2003)

EXHIBIT C

2009 UT 17
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter*

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
Cathy Child,
Petitionee,

No. 20081044

v.
F I L E D
David N. Child,
Respondent,

March 17, 20 09

Seventh District, Price Dep't
The Honorable Bruce K. Halliday
No. 024700194
Attorneys:

Rodney R. Parker, Salt Lake City, for petitioner
Joane Pappas White, Price, for respondent

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
PER CURIAM:

111 This matter is before the court upon a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, filed on December 22, 2008,
52
The petition is granted only as to the following
question:
Whether the court of appeals erred in awarding Respondent
"the full value of his 25% share in the [family rental]
business" without remanding for an opportunity to make
findings to support the district court's decision,
53
As to the limited issue described by this question, we
summarily reverse and remand. The court of appeals stated a
sufficient basis for reversal of the district court's decision
for a lack of findings, but it did not adequately support the
additional step of declaring that the identified exceptions to
the general rule excluding premarital property from the marital
estate had not been established. It appears the latter
conclusion could only be predicated on a distinct appellate
determination that (1) the arguments or evidence presented to the

district court were# as a matter of law, insufficient to invoke
or establish one of the exceptions, or (2) the district court
acted within its discretion in declining to make findings because
it properly deemed the arguments or evidence insufficient to
justify distinct findings as to an exception.

If, on remand, the

court of appeals is unable to make such an additional
determination to support the result it reached, the matter should
be remanded to the district court to provide findings to justify
or correct the result that court originally reached.
Accordingly, we remand to the court of appeals to take the action

it deems appropriate according to the directives described in
this order.

No. 20081044

2

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00-——
Dalene S. Cloyd,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
Timothy A. Cloyd Sr.,
Respondent and Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20080357-CA
F I L E D
(May~77 2009)
;

2009 UT App 123

Second District, Morgan Department, 974500042
The Honorable Michael G. Allphin
Attorneys:

Timothy A. Cloyd Sr., Clearfield, Appellant Pro Se
Brad C. Smith, Ogden, for Appellee

Before Judges Thorne, Bench, and Orroe.
PER CURIAM:
Timothy A. Cloyd Sr. appeals from the trial court's orders
entered March 19, 2008. We affirm.
Briefing standards are provided in rule 24 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 24. An appellate
brief must contain, among other things, a statement of the issues
for review, including the standard of review for each issue and a
record citation showing that each issue was preserved for appeal.
See icL. R. 24(a)(5). In addition, a statement of facts relevant
to the issues on appeal must be provided along with citations to"
the record to support the facts asserted^ See Td^ *. •Tt{*){•!) '
A bnet must also contain argument specifically setting forth the
contentions and reasons of an appellant regarding the issues
presented
and including citations to relevant legal authority.
^ ^ i*h R^ 24(a)(9), JV party challenging a finding of fact must
.marshal the evidence in support of thai finding. See
id~—Tol^
properly^.riefecrran argument must provide reasoned analysis

Mr cloyd;s briefing fails in all these respects. His
tat?^9^
i! incomprehensible and apparently unrelated to his
actual case. The stated issues challenge alimony and marital

property distribution, which issues were resolved by stipulation
in 2001. There is no fact section and no citations to the
record. There is no attempt to make any relevant point tied to
the facts of this case* His reply brief fares no better. It
contains allegations unsupported by the record, maligns thp trial
court, goes beyond the scope of a reply brief, and fails to
present any reasoned argument. It is well established that
appellate cqyrts will not address issues inadequately tvrigijgdSee MacflKav v» Hardy, 973 £,2d 941, 948 (Utah 1998). Accordingly,
the trial court's orders are affirmed—

^

_

i

i

ii

—

i

-

Dalene Cloyd requests that sanctions be imposed under rule
33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because Mr, Cloyd\e
appeal is frivolous. See Utah R. App. P. 33, MiAouglijMEL.
decline to award sanctions, costs are aw^rri^d piirczi-,ar^-h ..4-n m i o IA
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, See id. R. 34.
Additionally, because Ms, Cloyd was awarcfled^attorney,fees below,
she is entitled to them on appeal,See valcarce v, Fitzgerald,

H6i"»:2a jus,"Jiii iutah i^ysy:
The trial court's orders are affirmed and this matter is
remanded for a determination of costs and reasonable attorney
fees.

William A. Thorne Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Gregory K, Orme, Judge

2QQ80357-CA
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Richard Gardiner,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 20051162-CA

v.
F I L E D

Betty York and Interport,
Inc.,

(December 14, 2006)
2006 UT App 496|

Defendants and Appellee.

Fourth District, Fillmore Department, 016700050
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre Jr.
Attorneys: James K. Slavens, Fillmore, for Appellant
A. Samuel Primavera, Riverton, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, McHugh, and Thorne.
McHUGH, Judge:
fl
Richard Gardiner appeals from the trial court's order
denying his motion for attorney fees. In this case, we examine
whether attorney fees incurred in pursuing a fraudulent transfer
action are recoverable as consequential damages stemming from a
prior breach of contract. Because we hold that the trial court
failed to engage in the appropriate analysis of this issue, we
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
f2
Gardiner obtained a judgment of $7182, plus interest and
costs, against Interport, Inc. (Interport) for breach of
contract. The breach of corn-rant suit was tried and decided in
Virginia. Gardiner then domesticated the judgment in Utah.
f3
While the Virginia action was underway, Interport's
president, William York Jr., transferred Interport's only asset,
"a warehouse in Delta, Utah/ to his parentsr William York Sr. and
Betty York. After the judgment was domesticated, Gardiner filed

a petition for relief in Utah against Interport and Betty York, l
alleging that the transfer of the warehouse was fraudulent.
Gardiner sought either a judgmentlieiT or avoidance of the
transfer"! See Utah Code Ann. § 25-1T-8 (19^_gJ (settljcTgHEorth the
remedies of creditors who seek relief from debtors' fraudulent
transfer of assets). The trial court entered a default judgment
Against InterportT~after it failed to defend. A bench trial was"
held with Betty York as the remaining defendant. The trial court
found that Interport had transferred the warehouse with the
intent to defraud Gardiner and authorized a judgment lien aqajjo^t^
the property.2
f4
Gardiner then filed a motion to recover the attorney fees he
incurred in pursuing the fraudulent transfer litigation. The
trial court denied the motion. When the trial court denied
Gardiner's motion to reconsider the attorney fee ruling, he
appealed.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
f5
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in
denying Gardiner's request for attorney fees. Whether attorney
fees should be awarded is a legal issue that we review for
correctness. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah
1998).
ANALYSIS
I.

The Trial Court's Decision

f6
Gardiner requested an award of attorney fees at the
conclusion of trial. The trial court denied the motion,
reasoning that there was "no basis[,] either statutory or
contractual[,] why the fees should be awarded." Gardiner then
filed a motion to reconsider,3 clarifying that his argument for
1. William York Sr. passed away during this time and was not a
party to the fraudulent transfer action.
2. Betty York appealed the trial court's ruling that the
transfer was fraudulent. We affirmed the trial court's decision
in Gardiner v. York, 2006 UT App 433 (mem.) (per curiam).
3. Although postjudgment motions to reconsider are no longer
valid, see Gillett v. Price. 2006 UT 24,ff7-8, 135 P.3d 861, we
consider the denial of the motion to reconsider here because the
(continued...)
20051162-CA
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attorney fees was based on the "third-party litigation exception"
to the general rule that attorney fees are only recoverable when
authorized by statute or contract. In his memorandum in support
of his motion to reconsider, Gardiner cited Macris & Associates
v. Newavs, Inc., 2002 UT App 406, 60 P.3d 1176, and Collier v.
Heinz, 827 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), for the principle that
attorney fees may be recoverable as consequential damages in the
limited situation where the defendant's breach of contract4
foreseeably caused the plaintiff to incur attorney fees in
litigation with a third party. See Macris, 2002 UT App 406 at
ff13-14; Collier, 827 P.2d at 983-84. The trial court, however,
again denied attorney fees, this time stating that
[Gardiner] . . . cites the [c]ourt to the
case of rCollier 1 for the proposition that
there is a "third party exception" to the
general rule that a court should not award
attorney[] fees unless there is a statutory
or contractual basis to do so. The [c]ourt
finds the Collier decision to be limited only
to the situation where an insurer breaks its
contract with an insured, which is not the
situation in the present case.
Although the trial court correctly noted that Collier identified
a right to attorney fees that is unique to the insurance context,
it confused that rule with the more general third-party
litigation exception. See 827 P.2d at 984. "Under the thirdparty attorney fee[] exception, only the fees incurred in
litigation with the third party are recoverable as consequential
damages." Id. at 983-84. Attorney fees may not be awarded under
the third-party litigation exception when the litigation for
which fees are sought is between the contracting parties. See
id. at 984.

3. ( . . .continued)
motion was made before Gillett was issued, see Radakovich v.
Cornaby, 2006 UT App 454,117 & n.4 (noting Gillett was to be
applied prospectively).
4. Although this opinion refers to the third-party litigation
exception only in the context of contract law, the exception also
applies in tort law. See South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d
1279, 1282 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("[W]hen the natural consequence
of one's negligence is another!s involvement in a dispute with a
third party, attorney fees reasonably incurred in resolving the
dispute are recoverable from the negligent party as an element of
damages.").
20051162-CA
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The Collier court, however, noted that the Utah Supreme
Court in Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah
1989), carved out a separate exception in circumstances where an
insurer breached a contract with an insured. See 827 P.2d at
984-85. In such direct actions between an insured and his
insurer, attorney fees incurred in that action can be recovered.
See Bracey, 781 P.2d at 420; Collier, 827 P.2d at 984. The
insurance case rule, however, is distinct from the exception that
allows the recovery of fees incurred in third-party litigation if
the fees are consequential damages of the breach. The Collier
court explained: "The award of attorney fees as consequential
damages, outside the context of statutory and contractual
authorization, should be limited to . . . two situations . . . :
insurance contracts and the third-party exception ." 827 P.2d at
984 (emphasis added); cf. Puqh v. North Am. Warranty Servs.f
Inc., 2000 UT App 121,121 & n.7, 1 P.3d 570 (awarding attorney
fees in a breach of insurance contract case but noting that the
insurance contract exception should not be expanded beyond "the
realm of contracts fairly characterized as insurance contracts").
f8
The Collier court ultimately concluded that an award of
attorney fees was inappropriate in that case because neither the
third-party litigation exception nor the insurance contract
exception applied. See 827 P.2d at 985. There, the attorney
fees were incurred in a direct action between the contracting
parties and the contract at issue was a settlement agreement
rather than an insurance contract. See id. at 984-85. Here, the
trial court's decision on Gardiner's motion to reconsider focused
solely on the insurance case exception, despite the fact that the
third-party litigation exception and the insurance contract
exception are separate and distinct concepts. In this case,
Gardiner and Interport were the contracting parties, and Gardiner
sued a third party, Betty York, in the fraudulent transfer
litigation.5 Thus, although the trial court correctly rejected
the insurance exception, it erred in failing to analyze whether
the third-party litigation exception warranted an award of
attorney fees.
II.

The Third-Party Litigation Exception
as Applied to This Case

f9
On appeal, Gardiner argues that he is entitled to an award
of attorney fees because Interport's actions caused him to incur
those fees in obtaining a judgment lien against the warehouse.

5. As noted, Interport was originally a defendant in the
fraudulent transfer action, but after Interport failed to defend,
the trial court entered a default judgment against Interport and
the case went to trial against Betty York only.
20051162-CA
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In his brief, Gardiner argues primarily that Interport's
fraudulent transfer was the wrongful act that caused him to
engage in litigation with Betty York.6 We reiterate that the
third-party litigation exception "allows recovery of attorney
fees as consequential damages, but only in the limited situation
where the defendant's breach of contract foreseeably caused the
plaintiff to incur attorney fees through litigation with a third
party." Collier, 827 P.2d at 983 (emphasis added); see also
Lewiston State Bank v. Greenline Equip., L.L.C. , 2006 UT App
446,1121 (noting that the Utah Supreme Court "has allowed an award
of attorney fees as consequential damages arising from a breach
of contract, but only in limited contexts"). Therefore, attorney
fees are recoverable under this exception only if they are caused
by and are a foreseeable result of the original breach of
contract, not a subsequent wrongful act.
110 In Maoris & Associates v. Neways, Inc., 2002 UT App 406, 60
P. 3d 1176, this court considered the third-party litigation
exception under circumstances similar to those at issue here.
Plaintiff Macris originally filed suit for breach of contract
against Images and Attitude, Inc. See id. at 12. Images
subsequently sold its assets to Neways. See id. at 14. While
the breach of contract action was pending, Macris filed suit
against Neways, claiming that the transfer of assets from Images
to Neways was fraudulent and left Images with insufficient assets
to satisfy any judgment that Images might be required to pay as a
result of the breach of contract suit. See id. at 13,. Macris
prevailed in the breach of contract suit and Neways
International, Inc., a company separate from Neways, paid the
judgment. See id. at 17. Neways then filed a motion for summary
judgment in the fraudulent transfer suit, arguing that the suit
was rendered moot by Neways International's payment of the
judgment. See id. at 18. In response, Macris asserted that it
was entitled to recover the attorney fees incurred in the
fraudulent transfer action. See id. The trial court granted the
motion for summary judgment, holding that attorney fees were not
recoverable because the action arose under the Utah Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), which did not contain an express
provision authorizing an award of attorney fees. See id. at 19.

6. Gardiner asserts that "[the] fraudulent transfer necessitated
the litigation against Betty York to void the transfer of, or to
have a judgment lien on, the warehouse." At another point in his
brief, Gardiner contends that "it was foreseeable that
Interport's breach of contract and fraudulent conveyance to a
third party would compel Gardiner to pursue action, thus
incurring attorney[] fees, against Betty York in ordei: to collect
on his Virginia judgment."
20051162-CA
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til This court reversed, reasoning that the UFTA was a
codification of the common law and should be liberally construed.
See id. at 116 ("»[U]nless displaced by [the UFTA], the
principles of law and equity, including merchant law and the law
relating to principal and agent, equitable subordination,
estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause,
supplement [the UFTA's] provisions.'" (quoting Utah Code Ann.
§ 25-6-11 (1998)). Thus, this court in Maoris held that "the
third-party litigation exception is retained from common law and
may be applied to causes of action that arise under [the] UFTA."
Id. at If 17.
112 Despite this court's holding that the failure of the UFTA to
include an attorney fees provision did not necessarily bar an
award of attorney fees under the third-party litigation
exception, we nonetheless held that Macris had to demonstrate
that the fraudulent transfer action was a natural consequence of
Images's original breach of contract. See id. at U22. "[E]ven
though Macris [was] entitled to seek attorney fees incurred in
pursuing a UFTA claim using the third-party litigation exception,
it [was] limited by the requirements of the exception." Id. at
H18. Where the third-party litigation exception is at issue, and
the cause of action for which attorney fees are sought arises
under the UFTA, a party is not foreclosed from obtaining attorney
fees merely because the UFTA contains no fee provision. However,
to recover under the third-party litigation exception, the movant
must show that the original breach of contract foreseeably caused
it to incur attorney fees as consequential damages in the
subsequent UFTA litigation with the third party. Cf. Collier v.
Heinz, 827 P.2d 982, 983 (Utah 1992).
HI3 Gardiner, therefore, has the burden of demonstrating that it
was foreseeable that Interport's breach of contract would subject
him to attorney fees in the fraudulent transfer action against
Betty York. Whether expenses are foreseeable and therefore
recoverable as consequential damages flowing from a breach of
contract is a question of fact appropriately resolved by the
trial court. See Moore v. Energy Mut. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141,
1148 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). We therefore remand to the trial
court for a determination of whether Gardiner's fees were a
foreseeable result of Interport's breach of contract. However,
"a brief discussion of [consequential damages and foreseeability]
is appropriate as guidance for the trial court on remand." Armed
Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14,138, 70 P.3d 35. "[T]o
provide guidance to the trial court on remand[,] . . . we simply
set forth the applicable law." Id. at U41 (alterations and
omission in original) (quotations and citation omitted).

20051162-CA
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f14 Consequential damages are "those reasonably within the
contemplation off or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at
the time the contract was made."7 Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch. ,
701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985); see also Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT
104,130, 990 P.2d 933 ("To prove consequential damages, a
claimant must not only show a causal link between the breach and
the subsequent injury, but he must also show that the injury was
reasonably foreseeable or reasonably contemplated by the parties
at the time the contract was entered into.").
IF 15 In Pacific Coast Title Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co., 1 Utah 2d 377, 325 P.2d 906 (1958), the Utah
Supreme Court discussed foreseeability in analyzing the precise
question in this case—whether attorney fees expended in an
action against a third party were recoverable as consequential
damages of an original breach. In Pacific Coast, the contractor
failed to pay its subcontractors, laborers, and materialmen. See
id. at 907. As a result, they filed liens against the homes
under construction. See id. Plaintiff Pacific Coast, which was
responsible for keeping title to the properties unencumbered,
defended against the foreclosure of the liens. After settling
with the subcontractors, Pacific Coast filed suit against the
contractor's performance bond to recover the attorney fees and
costs incurred. See id. The supreme court acknowledged that
generally attorney fees are not recoverable absent statutory or
contractual authorization, but nonetheless awarded them to
Pacific Coast as consequential damages. See id. The supreme
court set forth principles of foreseeability, stating that
to be compensable, the loss must result from,
the breach in the natural and usual course of
events, so that it can fairly and reasonably
be said that if the minds of the parties had
averted to breach when the contract was made,
loss of such character would have been within
their contemplation.
Id. The court then reasoned that the award of attorney fees to
Pacific Coast was appropriate because it was foreseeable that the
contractor's failure to pay the workers "would bring about the
series of events" that occurred, including the filing of liens
and Pacific Coast's retention of attorneys to defend against
foreclosure. Id. at 908; see also Fleck v. National Prop. Mgmt.,
Inc., 590 P.2d 1254, 1255 (Utah 1979) (refusing to award
consequential damages because it was not foreseeable that

7. By contrast, "general damages" are "those flowing naturally
from the breach." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 701 P.2d 795, 801
(Utah 1985).
20051162-CA
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defendant's failure to improve subdivision lots would bring about
loss of plaintiffs' down payment on lots, since plaintiffs lost
title to lots through foreclosure of preexisting trust deeds).
1116 With these principles in mind, the trial court must
determine whether it was reasonably foreseeable, at the time that
Gardiner and Interport contracted, that Interport's breach of
contract would cause Gardiner to incur attorney fees in the
fraudulent transfer action against Betty York. If the trial
court concludes that the attorney fees were foreseeable and that
they resulted from Interport's breach, then the fees are
awardable as consequential damages under the third-party
litigation exception. If, however, the likelihood of an action
under the UFTA in the event of breach was not within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting, or there
was no causal link between the fees and the breach, no award of
attorney fees is appropriate under the third-party litigation
exception. See Collier v. Heinz. 827 P.2d 982, 983 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); Moore, 814 P.2d at 1147-48.
CONCLUSION
1117 Although the trial court correctly concluded that the
insurance case exception was unavailable to support an award of
attorney fees, it erred by failing to analyze whether Gardiner's
fees are recoverable under the third-party litigation exception.
We remand to the trial court for a determination of whether the
attorney fees Gardiner incurred in pursuing the fraudulent
transfer action were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
Interport's breach.
If 18 Reversed and remanded.

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

If 19 WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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Before Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and Orme,
PER CURIAM:
J.G„ (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights
in B.C.G. In his petition on appeal, Father asserts there was^
insufficient evidence to support the termination. However, he
has failed to provide this court with an adequate record to
review his claim, and thus, the trial court's order must be
affirmed.
Pursuant to rule 54(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, where an appellant intends to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding or conclusion,
"the appellant must include in the record a transcript of all
evidence relevant to" the challenged finding or conclusion. Utah
R. App. p. 54(a). Father has failed to provide the transcript of
his termination trial, in contravention of rule 54, In the

absence of an adequate record on appeal, we cannot reach the
issues raised and must presume the correctness of the
disposition. See State v. Miller, 718 P*2d 403, 405 (Utah 1996)
(per curiam).
Accordingly, the termination of Father's parental rights is
affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood/
Pr«bldiny Judge

William A. T h o m e Jr.,

Associate Presiding Judge

Gregory K, Orme, Judge
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
Kae JENSEN, Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
David Leon JENSEN, Respondent and Appellant.
No. 20061164-CA.
Jan. 2, 2009.
Background: Husband appealed from decision of
the Sixth District Court, Richfield Department,
David L. Mower, J., awarding wife one-half of the
increase in equity of closely held corporation,
which employed husband, and awarding wife attorney fees.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, P.J.,
held that:
(1) because husband did not own all of closely held
corporation, corporation's total increase in equity
was not available for distribution as a marital asset;
and
(2) wife was not entitled to one-half of the increased equity in closely held corporation, which
employed husband.
Reversed and remanded.
Orme, J., concurred specially and filed opinion.
West Headnotes
[t] Divorce 134 €^>252.1
134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k248 Disposition of Property
134k252.1 k. Discretion of Court. Most
Cited Cases
Divorce 134 €>^286(2)
134 Divorce
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134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k278 Appeal
134k286 Review
134k286(2) k. Presumptions. Most
Cited Cases
Trial court has considerable discretion concerning
property division in a divorce proceeding and, thus,
its actions enjoy a presumption of validity.
[21 Divorce 134 €==>286(1)
134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k278 Appeal
134k286 Review
134k286(l) k. Scope and Extent in
General. Most Cited Cases
Divorce 134 € ^ 2 8 6 ( 5 )
134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k278 Appeal
134k286 Review
134k286(3) Discretion of Lower Court
134k286(5) k. Disposition of Property. Most Cited Cases
Divorce 134 €=^286(8)
134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k278 Appeal
134k286 Review
134k286(6) Questions of Fact, Verdicts and Findings
134k286(8) k. Disposition of Property. Most Cited Cases
Appellate court will not disturb a property award in
divorce action unless appellate court determines
that there has been a misunderstanding or misap-
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plication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
[31 Appeal and Error 30 €=^842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
3 OXVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
3 0k 842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Appellate courts review the legal adequacy of findings of fact for correctness as a question of law.
[4] Divorce 134 €^>286(4)
134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k278 Appeal
134k286Review
134k286(3) Discretion of Lower Court
134k286(4) k. Temporary Alimony,
Counsel Fees and Expenses. Most Cited Cases
Appellate courts review a trial court's attorney fee
award in divorce proceedings for abuse of discretion.
[5] Divorce 134 €==>226
134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k220 Allowance for Counsel Fees and
Expenses
134k226 k. Application and Proceedings
Thereon. Most Cited Cases
Divorce 134 €==>287

Property
134k278 Appeal
134k287 k. Determination and Disposition of Questions. Most Cited Cases
To demonstrate that the trial court has acted within
its allotted discretion, the trial court must base the
attorney fee award in divorce action on evidence of
the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor
spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of
the requested fees; the failure to make such findings
requires remand for more detailed findings by the
trial court.
[6| Appeal and Error 30 €^>846(6)
30 Appeal and Error
3 OXVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k844 Review Dependent on Mode of
Trial in Lower Court
30k846 Trial by Court in General
30k846(6) k. Consideration and Effect of Findings or Failure to Make Findings. Most
Cited Cases
Trial 388 €^>395(5)
388 Trial
388X Trial by Court
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law
388k395 Sufficiency in General
388k395(5) k. Ultimate or Evidentiary
Facts. Most Cited Cases
To withstand appellate review, trial court's findings
of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by,
the evidence, and the findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.
[7] Divorce 134 €^>253(4)

134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of

134 Divorce
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134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k248 Disposition of Property
134k253 Proceedings for Division or Assignment
I34k253(4) k. Verdict or Findings.
Most Cited Cases
Divorce 134 € ^ 2 8 6 ( 9 )
134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134R278 Appeal
134k286 Review
134k286(9) k. Harmless Error. Most
Cited Cases
In dividing property in divorce cases, trial court
must identify the property in dispute and determine
whether each item is marital or separate property,
and failure of the trial court to make findings on all
material issues is reversible error unless the facts in
the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.

Cited Cases
Because husband did not own all of closely held
corporation, corporation's total increase in equity
was not available for distribution as a marital asset.
[10] Divorce 134 €==>252.3(3)
134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k248 Disposition of Property
134k252.3 Particular Property or Interests
and Mode of Allocation
134k252.3(3) k. Separate Property and
Property Acquired Before Marriage. Most Cited
Cases
Wife was not entitled to one-half of the increased
equity in closely-held family corporation, of which
husband was president and partial owner; wife did
not assist in running the business nor contribute in
any way to its increase in equity, and it was unclear
whether the increase in equity was due to anything
other than inflation.
fill Divorce 134 €^>226

[8] Divorce 134 €^>252.2
134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k248 Disposition of Property
134k252.2 k. Proportion or Share Given
on Division. Most Cited Cases
For marital assets to be distributed, the assets must
be in the possession of one, or both, of the marital
parties.
[9] Divorce 134 €=^252.3(1)
134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k248 Disposition of Property
134k252.3 Particular Property or Interests
and Mode of Allocation
134k252.3(l) k. In General. Most

134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k220 Allowance for Counsel Fees and
Expenses
134k226 k. Application and Proceedings
Thereon. Most Cited Cases
Divorce 134 € ^ ? 2 8 7
134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property
134k278 Appeal
134k287 k. Determination and Disposition of Questions. Most Cited Cases
Trial court's attorney fee award to wife in divorce
action could not stand because, while the court acknowledged that husband made more money than
wife, court made no findings on husband's ability to
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pay wife's attorney fees or on the reasonableness of
the fees incurred, and thus, remand was necessary.
*1021 Douglas L. Neeley, Manti, for Appellant.

beautician and massage therapist. At the time of trial, Wife was operating a massage therapy and cosmetology business out of the parties' residence.

Craig G. Adamson, Craig A. Hoggan, and Joelle S.
Kesler, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

T[ 4 Regarding A & D, the trial court found that the
corporation was organized in 1967 by Husband's
father and uncles. Through a series of transactions,
Husband became the owner of up to half of the corporation's issued shares. In addition, the trial court
found that from at least 2001, A & D's corporate
tax returns indicated that Husband and his brother,
Mark, each owned fifty percent of the corporation;
the two brothers "ha[d] been in charge of the
[corporation since the death of their father"; Husband was listed on various stock certificates as
owning fifty percent of A & D's stock; and Husband was the president of the corporation. The trial
court also noted that Husband's mother testified that
she owned A & D stock, but had assigned her interest in that stock to her two sons, and the assignment "would become a full transfer upon her
death." The trial court also found that over the
course of the *1022 parties' marriage, A & D's
equity increased by $230,851.

Before GREENWOOD, P.J., and BILLINGS
and ORME, JJ.

FN1

FN1. Judge Billings acted on this case prior to her retirement on Dec. 31, 2008.

OPINION
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
1f 1 David Leon Jensen (Husband) appeals from the
trial court's Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, arguing that the trial court
erred by awarding Kae Jensen (Wife) one-half of
the increase in equity of A & D Contractors, Inc. (A
& D) and by awarding Wife attorney fees without
entering findings on all of the necessary factors.
We reverse the trial court's award of one-half of the
increased equity in A & D to Wife and reverse and
remand for reconsideration of and adequate findings on the award of attorney fees to Wife.

BACKGROUND
If 2 Husband and Wife were married for seventeen
years and had one child together. They were divorced in July 2005, pursuant to a bifurcated decree
and subsequently participated in a three-day trial
addressing the division of property and debt.
H 3 At the close of trial, the court found that Husband was employed by A & D, a closely held corporation, throughout the parties' marriage. The trial
court also found that Wife was the primary
"homemaker and caretaker" of the parties' child.
From 1991 forward, Wife worked part-time as a

If 5 Based on these findings, the trial court awarded
Husband all the stock he "owns in A & D ... because it is his separate property acquired by gift."
" The court also ordered that the entire $230,851
increase in A & D's equity "should be divided
between the parties. It is marital property because
{Wife] has contributed to such increase by taking
upon herself the household responsibilities and care
of the child." The court also ordered Husband to
pay Wife's attorney fees in the amount of
$12,562.50. Husband appeals.
FN2. Actually, according to Husband's
testimony, Husband acquired part of his
stock by purchase funded by A & D despite Husband's written agreement to pay
for the stock himself.

ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW
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spouse to preserve or augment the asset," as compared to situations where there is a "lack of such efforts." 760 P.2d at 306.
U 15 In the case before us, the trial court found that
Wife "was the primary homemaker and caretaker of
[the parties' child]." Wife "has a beautician license
and a massage therapist license" and "began working as [a] massage therapist in December of 1991."
Wife "contributed to family finances by operating
massage therapy and cosmetology businesses" in
part of the parties' home. Based on these findings,
the trial court concluded Wife should be awarded
part of the increased equity in A & D, stating, "It is
marital property because [Wife] has contributed to
such increase by taking upon herself the household
responsibilities and care of the child." The trial
court then made several offsets to the respective
awards of equity.
f 16 The court's findings regarding Wife's contributions to A & D's equity are inadequate to justify the
award. They are vastly different in character and
quantity than those found to justify an award in our
recent case law. Wife did not assist in running the
business nor contribute in any way to its increase in
equity. Moreover, it is unclear whether the increase
in equity was due to anything other than inflation.
See Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987)
(rejecting claim to appreciation of spouse's separate
property, in part because the added value "came
solely from the effects of inflation"). Wife behaved
in a very normal and commendable manner by
caring for the parties' child, maintaining the household, and running her own part-time business from
their home. More is required, however, to justify an
award of Husband's separate property.
If 17 We note that Wife did not seek an award of the
equity in A & D based on Mortens en's second circumstance, requiring extraordinary situations. See
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. At trial, Wife argued
that an award of an interest in A & D was justified
either because the property had been commingled
or because she had contributed sufficiently to its
operation and success. In addition, the trial court

made no findings that would justify the award on
that basis. Thus, it differs from Kunzler, where the
majority of this court held that the wife had adequately preserved the issue of an equitable award
because of extraordinary situations and the facts
were supportive of that theory. See Kunzler, 2008
UT App 263, ffi[ 33, 37, 190 P.3d 497. Therefore,
we reverse the trial court's award to Wife of onehalf of the increased equity in A & D and remand
for reconsideration of other aspects of the divorce
decree that may need to be adjusted in light of our
decision.
II. Attorney Fees
[11] ^f 18 Husband also argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees
without analyzing certain necessary factors. As this
court has recognized, when awarding attorney fees
in divorce cases, the trial court is required to make
explicit findings regarding "the financial need of
the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse
to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fees." Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App
11, U 49, 176 P.3d 476 (internal quotation marks
omitted). While Wife admits that "the trial court
did not make any explicit findings to support its
award of attorney[ ] fee[s]," she argues that the
court's findings on the aforementioned factors can
be implied from the record. In this case, the court
acknowledged that Husband makes more money
than Wife, but it made no findings on Husband's
ability to pay Wife's attorney fees or on the reasonableness of the fees incurred. Moreover, the record
is not adequate to imply findings on the omitted
factors. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's
attorney fee award and remand for reconsideration
and entry of sufficient findings of fact thereon.

CONCLUSION
f 19 The trial court's property award of equity in A
& D is based on insufficient findings of fact regarding ownership of the corporation and appears to
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H
Supreme Court of Utah.
Holli LUNDAHL, Petitioner,
v.
The Honorable Anthony QUINN, Respondent.
N.A.R. INC., Mark T. Olson, Olson & Associates,
P.C., Anthony Tidwell, D.D.S., and Olympus View
Dental Center, Respondents and Real Parties in Interest.
No. 20030062.
April 1,2003.
Rehearing Denied April 1, 2003.
Pro se litigant sought to intervene in underlying
collections action. The District Court, Salt Lake
County, Anthony B. Qumn, J., refused to address
litigant's legal filings. Litigant petitioned for extraordinary writ. The Supreme Court held that: (1)
when an individual avails herself of the judicial machinery as a matter of routine, special leniency on
the basis of pro se status is manifestly inappropriate; (2) litigant would no longer be afforded reasonable indulgence; (3) litigant's petition was frivolous
on its face; and (4) real parties in interest were entitled to attorney fees and double costs for defending action.
So ordered.
West Headnotes
fl] Attorney and Client 45 €^>62
45 Attorney and Client
4511 Retainer and Authority
45k62 k. Rights of Litigants to Act in Person
or by Attorney. Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court is generally lenient with pro se litigants.
[2] Attorney and Client 45 €=^>62
45 Attorney and Client
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45TI Retainer and Authority
45k62 k. Rights of Litigants to Act in Person
or by Attorney. Most Cited Cases
When an individual avails herself of the judicial
machinery as a matter of routine, special leniency
on the basis of pro se status is manifestly inappropriate, particularly when the filings in question are
routinely frivolous and have been brought with the
apparent purpose, or at least effect, of harassment,
not only of opposing parties, but of the judicial machinery itself.
[3] Attorney and Client 45 €=>62
45 Attorney and Client
4511 Retainer and Authority
45k62 k. Rights of Litigants to Act in Person
or by Attorney. Most Cited Cases
Pro se litigant who had history of filing numerous
pro se actions would no longer be afforded reasonable indulgence, and thus, litigant would be charged
with full knowledge and understanding of all relevant statutes, rules, and case law, where litigant had
chosen to make legal self-representation a full-time
hobby, if not a career.
[4] Attorney and Client 45 €^>62
45 Attorney and Client
45II Retainer and Authority
45k62 k. Rights of Litigants to Act in Person
or by Attorney. Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court deemed any argument by pro se litigant that attempted to distort legal authority for
purpose of evading or circumventing proscription
against unlicensed practice of law as not brought in
good faith, for purposes of litigant's petition seeking extraordinary writ allowing her to intervene in
underlying collections action, where litigant had
been expressly informed in the past that she could
not represent the legal interests of other persons and
litigant cited statute prohibiting practicing law
without a license in petition. U.C.A.I 953,
78-9-101(3).
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[5] Costs 102 € ^ > 2
102 Costs
102J Nature, Grounds, and Extent of Right in
General
102kl Nature and Grounds of Right
102k2 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Pro se litigant's petition for extraordinary writ, requesting an order directing trial court to allow her
to intervene as a matter of right in underlying collections action, failed to comply with requisite
standard for asserting such a petition, and thus, petition was frivolous on its face; rule governing substitution of parties provided proper mechanism, if
any, for litigant to obtain relief she requested, and
litigant did not document basis in law for bringing
such a petition nor did she even purport to argue in
favor of a good faith extension or modification.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 25(c), 65B(a).
[6] Parties 287 €=^58
287 Parties
2871V New Parties and Change of Parties
287k57 Substitution
287k58 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Courts cannot be compelled to recognize a substitution of parties at the whim of the movant. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 25(c).
[71 Appeal and Error 30 €==>428(2)
30 Appeal and Error
30VII Transfer of Cause
30VII(D) Writ of Error, Citation, or Notice
30k428 Filing Notice and Proof of Service
30k428(2) k. Time for Filing. Most
Cited Cases
Where a timely motion for attorney fees is interposed, the time for filing a notice of appeal does
not begin to run until a final order fixing the
amount of those fees is entered.

Page 2

287k57 Substitution
287k61 k. Application and Proceedings
Thereon. Most Cited Cases
Provision in rule governing substitution of parties
that the action "may be continued by or against the
original party," unless the court grants a motion for
substitution, preserves the court's inherent power to
manage the case without undue disruption, confusion, or interference. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 25(c).
|9| Parties 287 C=>6(1)
287 Parties
2871 Plaintiffs
2871(A) Persons Who May or Must Sue
287k6 Real Party in Interest
287k6(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Pretrial Procedure 307A €^>556.1
307A Pretrial Procedure
307A1II Dismissal
307AIII(B) Involuntary Dismissal
307AIII(B)2 Grounds in General
307Ak556 Parties, Defects as to
307Ak556.1 k. [n General. Most
Cited Cases
Rule requiring actions to be brought in the name of
a real party in interest and prohibiting dismissal of
action on ground that it was not prosecuted in name
of real party in interest until court had appropriately
examined the issue was inapplicable to pro se litigant's request to intervene in undei lying collections
action as a matter of right for purposes of pursuing
counterclaim, where there was no question that
counterclaims were initially brought in name of a
real party in interest and basis for dismissal of lawsuit had nothing to do with litigant's belated assertion that she should be allowed to intervene. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 17(a).
[10] Costs 102 €==>66

[8] Parties 287 €^>61
287 Parties
287IV New Parties and Change of Parties

102 Costs
102T Nature, Grounds, and Extent of Right in
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General
102k65 Increased Costs, and Double or
Treble Costs
102k66 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Costs 102 €==>194.44
102 Costs
102 VIII Attorney Fees
102k 194.44 k. Bad Faith or Meritless Litigation. Most Cited Cases
Pro se litigant's frivolous petition for extraordinary
relief, requesting an order directing trial court to allow her to intervene as a matter of right in underlying collections action, entitled real parties in interest to attorney fees and double costs for defending such petition. Rules App.Proc, Rule 33(c)(1);
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65B(a).
fill Costs 102 €^>128
102 Costs
102VI Security for Costs; Proceedings in Forma
Pauperis
102kl27 Action or Defense in Forma Pauperis
102kl28 k. Nature and Grounds of Right.
Most Cited Cases
Ordinarily, where litigants cannot afford to pay a
filing fee, that fee is waived so that poverty will not
create a de facto barrier to access to the courts.
*1001 Holli Lundahl, petitioner pro se.
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Judge Quinn.
Ronald F. Price, Salt Lake City, for N.A.R., Mark
Olson, Olson & Associates, Anthony Tidwell,
Olympus View Dental Center.
PER CURIAM:
| 1 This matter comes before the court on petition
for extraordinary writ. The petitioner, Holli
Lundahl, asserts she has filed a motion to intervene
and an amended counterclaim complaint on which
the district court refused to rule because it deemed
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her a nonparty to the action. Judge Anthony Quinn
filed a response, as did N.A.R. Inc., Mark T. Olson,
Olson & Associates, P.C., Anthony Tidwell,
D.D.S., and Olympus View Dental Center as real
parties in interest. We deny the petition and further
hold that it is frivolous.
| 2 As background to this court's order on this petition, a brief recitation of the history of petitioner's
many appearances before this court is appropriate.
Since 1999, Holli Lundahl
has submitted no
fewer than twenty-seven filings, consisting of nineteen appeals, four petitions for extraordinary writ
(including the instant petition), two petitions for
writ of certiorari, and two petitions for interlocutory appeal. Of these, five appeals are presently
pending before either this court or the court of appeals,
" two decisions on appeal were summarily
affirmed, one decision on appeal has been affirmed
per curiam, four appeals were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction (including Holli's attempt to appeal a
criminal case where the lower court had dismissed
the charges against her), two appeals were dismissed as premature, one appeal was dismissed for
an improper rule 54(b) certification, and one appeal
was voluntarily dismissed. Three petitions for extraordinary writ, two petitions for writ of certiorari,
and two petitions for interlocutory appeal have been
denied.
FN1. Because this matter was originally
brought as a counterclaim by Holli
Lundahl's sister, Kelli Lundahl, we generally will refer to them by their first names
to avoid confusion.
FN2. Four of the nineteen appeals noted
above were consolidated into a single action, leaving sixteen separate appeals for
disposition.
t 3 In Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213
(Utah 1983), this court held that "as a general rule,
a party who represents himself will be held to the
same standard of knowledge and practice as any
qualified member of the bar." Nevertheless, Nelson
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also noted that " 'because of his lack of technical
knowledge of law and procedure [a layman acting
as his own attorney] should be accorded
every* 1002 consideration that may reasonably be
indulged.' " Id. (bracketed language in original)
(quoting Ileathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 268,
372P.2d990, 991 (1962)).
[1][2] U 4 Accordingly, this court generally is lenient with pro se litigants. Individuals have a right to
represent themselves without being compelled to
seek professional assistance. Where they are largely
strangers to the legal system, courts are understandably loath to sanction them for a procedural misstep
here or there. Holli, however, is hardly a stranger to
the legal system. Where most ordinary individuals
find themselves in court on only a handful of occasions in their lives, Holli has managed to embroil
herself in more litigation in just a few short years
than one would think humanly possible. When an
individual avails herself of the judicial machinery
as a matter of routine, special leniency on the basis
of pro se status is manifestly inappropriate.
[3] U 5 This is particularly true where the filings in
question are routinely frivolous and have been
brought with the apparent purpose, or at least effect, of harassment, not only of opposing parties,
but of the judicial machinery itself. When Holli is
unsuccessful in obtaining the relief she seeks, she
has not infrequently resorted to collateral attack on
the judges who have adjudicated her cases. Indeed,
a significant number of the direct appeals Holli has
filed have been brought from district court denials
of petitions for extraordinary relief naming judges
as defendants. Therefore, notwithstanding the
dictum in Nelson cautioning courts to be lenient
with pro se litigants, we now make clear that the
reasonable indulgence that has been afforded to
Holli in the past is at an end. Where Holli has
chosen to make legal self-representation a full-time
hobby, if not a career, it is not too much to expect
her to strictly abide by the rules governing the appearances of parties before this court. Therefore,
she shall be charged with full knowledge and un-
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derstanding of all relevant statutes rules, and case
law.
\ 6 We also note Holli has occasionally employed
the right to self-representation in a questionable
manner. In this petition, as well as in at least three
other recent appellate filings, Holli has purportedly
acquired another person's cause of action by assignment and then has professed to represent that cause
of action in her own right. J The Utah State Bar
Rules of Integration and Management do not
"prohibit a person who is unlicensed as an attorney
at law ... from personally representing that person's
own interests in a cause to which the person is a
party." Utah State Bar R. Integration and Management R. Ill(T). However, this exception to the prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law is limited to actions where "the person is a party in his or
her own right and not as an assignee."
Id.
(emphasis added). In this petition, Holli concedes
the original cause of action belonged solely to Kelli
Lundahl. On pages five and six of her petition,
Holli asserts Kelli's counsel abandoned her on the
morning of a hearing to determine a motion for
summary judgment. Holli then states that "Kelli
was unable to obtain other counsel willing to sue an
attorney. Accordingly, Kelli assigned her property
damage claims to Holli Lundahl." (Emphasis added.) In other words, the expressed purpose of the
assignment was to allow Holli to prosecute the action because Kelli could not obtain a licensed attorney.
FN3. Lundahl v. Alta View Hospital, No.
20020749; Lundahl v. Qwest Communications, No. 20020748; Lundahl v. IHC, No.
20010336. The response to the instant petition also contains some very troubling allegations that Holli has appeared at hearings and misrepresented herself as Kelli
acting pro se. Respondents have attached
an affidavit stating a person other than
Kelli has appeared at hearings and represented herself as Kelli. We note that this affidavit does not explicitly identify Holli
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Lundahl as the person appearing; we also
note some of the allegations are not supported by affidavit and are hearsay. We
therefore make clear that they do not affect
our decision today.
FN4. Subsection 78-9-101(3) of the Utah
Code contains substantially the same provision. Initially scheduled to be repealed
on May 1, 2003, the repeal date has been
extended to May 3, 2004. See H.B. 349 SI,
2003 Gen. Sess. (Utah) (enacted).
[4] 1f 7 We offer no ruling at this time regarding
whether Holli has violated the proscription* 1003
on the unauthorized practice of law. Nonetheless, it
remains pertinent to our purposes here that she actually cited section 78-9-101 of the Utah Code in
her petition and that she has been expressly informed in the past that she cannot represent the legal interests of other persons.
Consequently, we
deem any argument that attempts to distort legal authority for the purpose of evading or circumventing
the proscription against unlicensed practice as not
brought in good faith.
FN5. E.g., Lundahl v. Alta View Hospital,
No. 20020749 (letter from court dated October 23, 2002).
| 8Rule 33(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides: "[A] frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good
faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." With this standard in mind, we turn to the
present petition. The underlying collections action
was commenced against Kelli as a defendant. The
plaintiffs eventually agreed to dismiss the action
with prejudice, apparently due to settlement of the
claim. However, the case continued forward because Kelli elected to pursue a counterclaim against
the plaintiff and other parties. On November 25,
2002, the district court granted the counterclaim defendants' motion for summary judgment and directed counsel to prepare the order. According to
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Holli's petition, Kelli assigned her claims on
December 4, 2002. Holli asserts she then moved to
FTsT6
intervene
on December 6, followed by numerous motions and objections. The counterclaim defendants moved for attorney fees, and the district
court scheduled a hearing on that matter. Apparently, an order relating to the November 25 ruling
was filed on December 27, and the hearing on attorney fees was conducted on January 16, 2003. The
transcript of the January 16, 2003, hearing before
the district court indicates Kelli appeared and was
represented by licensed legal counsel. It is not clear
whether Holli was present at the hearing. The district court indicated it would award a fixed amount
of attorney fees and directed the counterclaim defendants' counsel to prepare an order. The district
court stated it would not address Holli's pleadings
because she was not a party to the case. It also specifically stated it would not allow Holli to appear as
a party unless she filed a motion for substitution
pursuant to rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Holli then brought the instant petition,
requesting an order directing the district court to allow her to intervene as a matter of right.
FN6. The respondents to the petition dispute whether this motion was actually
filed. They assert Holli obtained a datestamped copy without leaving a copy for
the district court. While these allegations
are also troubling, resolution of the conflicting allegations is not material to our
decision here. For the limited purpose of
reviewing this petition, we will assume the
motion to intervene was in fact filed.
[5] If 9 Based on the documentation provided by the
petition,
it is not warranted by existing law. A
petition for extraordinary writ may be brought only
where "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
is available." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). While Holli
acknowledges this standard, her petition manifestly
fails to comply with it.
FN7. The bulk of the allegations of fact in
Holli's petition are argumentative, conclus-
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ory, or irrelevant. Because this court does
not have access to the record, it must necessarily rely on those facts, and documents properly derived from that record
and submitted as part of the petition to
guide its determination of frivolousness.
[6] [7][8] f 10 Where a chose in action is purportedly conveyed after a legal action concerning it
already has been filed by the original party in interest, the assignee may be required to obtain a substitution of parties according to the dictates of rule
25(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; specifically:
"the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the
person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action." Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c). While
rule 25(c) speaks in permissive rather than mandatory terms, it is clear courts cannot be compelled to
recognize a substitution of parties at the whim of
the movant. See, e.g., Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 927 n. 6 (Utah 1982) (upholding
denial of motion for substitution of real party in interest, where motion was filed subsequent to default
judgment). *1004 The provision that the action
"may be continued by or against the original party,"
unless the court grants a motion for substitution,
preserves the court's inherent power to manage the
case without undue disruption, confusion, or interFN8
ference.
See Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559, 561,
252 P.2d 538, 539(1953).
FN8. One of Holli's asserted justifications
for seeking an extraordinary writ is her
claim that the time for filing a notice of appeal began to run on December 27, 2002.
The real parties in interest, on the other
hand, assert that order was not a final judgment. Regardless, where a timely motion
for attorney fees is interposed, the time for
filing a notice of appeal does not begin to
run until a final order fixing the amount of
those fees is entered. See Promax Dev.
Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, f 15, 998 P.2d
254 ("[A] trial court must determine the
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amount of attorney fees awardable to a
party before the judgmenl becomes final
for purposes of appeal."); see also Sittner
v. Schnever, 2000 UT 45, If 19, 2 P.3d 442.
In this case, the final order on the motion
for attorney fees had nol been filed at the
time Holli submitted this petition, and, in
any event, Holli's own failure to timely
move for substitution does not create an
emergency necessitating this court's intervention.
[9] f 11 Holli instead improperly moved to intervene as a matter of right under rule 24(a).
Rule
24(a) grants a right to intervene, upon "timely application," where the applicant "claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action." Holli, howe\er, cannot claim
an independent interest relating to either property
or a transaction because the "transaction" at issue is
the alleged conveyance of the chose in action itself.
If courts were to countenance such subterfuges, it
would confer an unconditional right to intervene on
the entire universe of individuals or entities legally
capable of accepting the assignment of a cause of
action.
FN9. Holli additionally relies on rule 17(a)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 17(a)
requires actions to be brought in the name
of a real party in interest. It also prohibits
dismissal of the action "on the ground that
it is not prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest," until the court has appropriately examined the issue. This rule
plainly is inapposite. There is no question
the counterclaims initially were brought in
the name of a real party in interest. Also,
the basis for dismissal of the lawsuit had
nothing to do with Holli's belated assertion
that she should be allowed to intervene; indeed, the district court granted summaiy
judgment before Holli received her purported assignment.
| 12 Consequently, the district court's justifiable re-
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fusal to address a multitude of last-ditch, disruptive
legal filings was well within its discretion and supported by Holli's failure to avail herself of the procedural rule designed to afford her the relief she
claimed. Holli has documented no basis in law for
bringing a petition for extraordinary writ. Nor does
she even purport to argue in favor of a good faith
extension or modification. Instead, the legal analysis she presents in support of her petition is confined
to a conclusory assertion that she has a statutory
right to intervene, accompanied by several manifestly inapposite citations. Where rule 25(c)
provided the proper mechanism, if any, for Holli to
obtain the relief she requests,
her petition for
extraordinary relief is frivolous on its face.
FN10. Since rule 38 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure allows the appellate
court to independently determine proper
substitution of parties, Holli would not
have been deprived of her right to seek
substitution even if she had brought a
proper motion for substitution and the district court had failed to rule on it prior to
entry of final judgment. Assuming, without
deciding, that a motion for substitution
brought just prior to entry of final judgment would not toll the time for filing a
notice of appeal, the right to appeal would
remain vested in Kelli, and Holli could employ rule 38 to pursue her claim of substitution before the appellate court.
[10] ^ 13 We therefore turn to the appropriate consequence for filing a frivolous pleading. Rule 33(a)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
that "if the court determines that a motion made or
appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or
FN 11
for delay, it shall award just damages."
Pursuant to this provision, the real-party-in-interest respondents have requested costs and attorney fees.
See Utah R. App. P. 33(c)(1). We hold N.A.R. Inc.,
Mark Olson, Olson & Associates, P.C., Anthony
Tidwell, D.D.S., and Olympus View Dental Center
are entitled to attorney fees and double costs for the

Page 7

time and resources expended in *1005 defending
against this frivolous petition. We direct the district
court to determine the amount of those sanctions
and to take whatever other actions it deems appropriate within its jurisdictional authority.
FN11. For purposes of this rule, "a motion
made or appeal taken" necessarily includes
all filings that are submitted to this court.
Otherwise, parties would be excused from
the consequences of filing a frivolous petition for discretionary review.
[11] f 14 We also wish to address Holli's history of
consuming judicial resources without demonstrating adequate legal justification. Although certain
fees are assessed against parties who avail themselves of the services of the courts, the judiciary of
this state is largely funded by the taxpayers. It
stands to reason that Holli should not be allowed to
harass the judiciary of this state at public expense.
While this court does not deem it appropriate at this
time to assess a fine specifically designed to compensate the state for the resources Holli has consumed with frivolous litigation, there remains the
matter of filing fees. Ordinarily, where litigants
cannot afford to pay a filing fee, that fee is waived
so that poverty will not create a de facto barrier to
access to the courts. Holli routinely has taken advantage of the affidavit of impecuniosity to obtain
virtually cost-free access to this court. Under the
unusual circumstances of this case, and in light of
her previous multitude of filings, this court enters
the following ruling directed to the Clerk of the
Utah Supreme Court: In any future filing of a petition for discretionary review by Holli Lundahl, the
Clerk shall allow only a conditional waiver of the
filing fee. In the event Holli's pleadings violate rule
33 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the conditional waiver of the fee will be revoked and Holli
Lundahl will be barred from submitting any future
filing of a petition for discretionary review until the
filing fee is paid.
f 15 Furthermore, any motion for sanctions brought
by an opposing party, or on the court's own motion,
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shall be judged by the standard set forth above.
Specifically, Holli shall not receive any leniency of
treatment based merely on nominal pro se status.
Other courts of this state may take note of our ruling and respond appropriately. The courts of this
state possess the powers necessary to maintain the
orderly disposition of matters brought before them,
including the power to levy sanctions and, in appropriate cases, to hold in contempt the parties who appear before them.
f 16 In conclusion, we emphasize any prospective
penalties will be applicable only to cases where
Holli Lundahl fails to meet the threshold requirements of applicable laws and court rules. Any party
who comes before the courts is obliged to abide by
these in any event. Thus, the prospective portion of
our ruling does not mandate sanctions per se, but
merely constitutes a reminder and a warning that
such sanctions are available and applicable. Holli
Lundahl's privilege to access to the courts will be
preserved in direct proportion to her willingness to
accept the responsibilities accompanying that privilege.
117 Justice PARRTSH does not participate herein.
Utah,2003.
Lundahl v. Quinn
67 P.3d 1000, 470 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 2003 UT 11
END OF DOCUMENT
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award property that does not belong to Husband.
Furthermore, the findings of fact do not support the
trial court's conclusion that Wife contributed to the
growth in equity sufficiently to entitle her to an
award of any portion of the equity. *1026 We reverse the trial court's award of one-half of A & D's
increased equity and remand for adjustments in other portions of the decree necessitated by this decision. We also reverse and remand for reconsideration the trial court's attorney fee award in favor of
Wife because the trial court failed to enter findings
on all of the required factors.
t 20 I CONCUR: Judith M. Billings, Judge.ORME,
Judge (concurring specially):
If 21 I agree with the analysis in Parts 1(B) and II of
the lead opinion. I concur in the decision to remand
the case so that the trial court can adjust its decree,
if necessary, in light of our reversal of the award to
Wife of the increased value of the equity in A & D.
I also agree that, once this has been accomplished,
the trial court should reconsider the award of attorney fees in the context of making adequate factual
findings on the required criteria. The primary focus
will, necessarily, be on Wife's need for assistance
in paying her attorney fees given the property division and support provisions of the revised decree.

the shares held beneficially by Husband. I could see
the need to opine on these matters if we held in Part
1(B) that Wife had some claim on the equity in A &
D and the question then arose as to what portion of
A & D's equity actually belonged to Husband and
was thus awardable, in whole or in part, to Wife.
But Husband's ownership percentage just does not
matter in this divorce proceeding once we hold
Wife has no claim on any of the equity in A & D.
f 23 The ownership interests of Husband, his brother, and his mother may need to be sorted out among
themselves, but no findings the trial court made in
this regard are binding in any way on the brother,
the mother, or the corporation, given that they were
not parties. Accordingly, there is no reason for us to
deal with the stock ownership issue beyond making
this simple observation.
Utah App.,2009.
Jensen v. Jensen
203 P.3d 1020, 620 Utah Adv. Rep. 56, 2009 UT
App 1
END OF DOCUMENT

f 22 I do not join in Part 1(A) of the lead opinionnot so much because I disagree with the analysis
but because it is completely unnecessary to reach
the issue treated in Part 1(A) in view of our resolution in Part 1(B). In Part 1(B) we hold Wife has no
claim on the increased value of the equity in A & D
because her contributions to the marriage in childrearing and homemaking are not the kind of business- or investment-related contributions envisioned in the line of cases beginning with
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah
1988), as warranting an award of one spouse's separate property to the other spouse. Thus, it simply
does not matter, in the posture of this case, whether
Husband owns all or only some of the stock in A &
D or whether the increased value identified by the
trial court is attributable to all issued shares or only
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Brett W. NELSON, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Jeff JACOBSEN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 17667.
Aug. 31, 1983.
Action was instituted for alleged alienation of
wife's affections. The Sixth District Court, Sanpete
County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment for
plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Supreme
Court, Oaks, J., held that: (1) notice of trial described nature of proceedings against unrepresented
defendant in such ambiguous terms that it deprived
him of adequate time to prepare for his defense in
violation of his right to due process; (2) an action
for alienation of affections was still a viable cause
of action in Utah, but in order for plaintiff to recover, it was necessary to establish that causal effect of
defendant's conduct outweighed combined effect of
all other causes, including conduct of plaintiff and
alienated spouse; (3) punitive damages were recoverable as long as plaintiff showed circumstances of
aggravation in addition to malice implied by law
from conduct of defendant in causing separation of
plaintiff and his spouse; and (4) an award of punitive damages could not be entered, however, without
first adducing evidence or making findings of fact
with regard to defendant's net worth or income.
Reversed and remanded.
Hall, C.J., and Stewart, J., concurred in part and
dissented in part and filed separate opinions.
Durham, J., concurred in result and dissented in
part and filed opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Constitutional Law 92 €=>3881

92 Constitutional Law
92XXVTI Due Process
92XXVTI(B) Protections Provided and
Deprivations Prohibited in General
92k3878 Notice and Hearing
92k3881 k. Notice. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k251.6)
A party is deprived of due process where notice is
ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party of
nature of proceeding against him or is not given
sufficiently in advance of proceeding to permit preparation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
|2] Constitutional Law 92 C^>3881
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVIT Due Process
92XXVTI(B) Protections Provided and
Deprivations Prohibited in General
92k3878 Notice and Hearing
92k3881 k. Notice. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k251.6)
To satisfy an essential requisite of procedural due
process, a "hearing" must be prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs the parties of the
specific issues they must prepare to meet. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 14.
[3] Constitutional Law 92 €=^3875
92 Constitutional Law
92XXV11 Due Process
92XXV1I(B) Protections Provided and
Deprivations Prohibited in General
92k3875 k. Factors Considered; Flexibility and Balancing. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k251.5)
"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be
reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place, and circumstances, but is a concept
which rests upon basic fairness and demands a procedure that is appropriate to case and just to parties
involved. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
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[4] Constitutional Law 92 €^>3993
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVII Due Process
92XXVII(E) Civil Actions and Proceedings
92k3991 Trial
92k3993 k. Time of Trial. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 92k314)
Notice of trial given an unrepresented defendant in
form of an oral statement that case had been set for
"hearing" two weeks later was not a clear notice
that defendant, who was uneducated and inexperienced, had to be ready for "trial" on that date and,
hence, was so ambiguous as to deprive defendant of
adequate time to prepare his defense in violation of
his constitutional right to due process. LT.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
[5] Attorney and Client 45 €=^62
45 Attorney and Client
4 5II Retainer and Authority
45k62 k. Rights of Litigants to Act in Person
or by Attorney. Most Cited Cases
A layman is entitled to undertake his own representation, but due to his lack of technical knowledge
of law and procedure, he should be accorded every
consideration that may reasonably be indulged and,
though this would not include interrupting course of
proceedings to translate legal terms, explain legal
rules, or otherwise attempting to redress ongoing
consequences of layman's decision to function in a
capacity for which he was not trained, it would include informing layman of date of trial more than
two days before it was to begin and advising him of
such matters as his right to a trial by jury and right
to require any previously retained counsel to
provide case file and other documents whose preparation had been covered by prior representation.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[6] Husband and Wife 205 €=>324
205 Husband and Wife
205X Enticing and Alienating

205k323 Right of Action
205k324 k. By Husband. Most Cited
Cases
Husband and Wife 205 €=>325
205 Husband and Wife
205X Enticing and Alienating
205k323 Right of Action
205k325 k. By Wife. Most Cited Cases
Right to recover for alienation of affections now
extends to both spouses equally and, rather than being based on premise that either spouse constitutes
the "property" of the other, is based on the premise
that each spouse has a valuable interest in the marriage relationship, including its intimacy, companionship, support, duties, and affection.
[7] Husband and Wife 205 €^>322
205 Husband and Wife
205X Enticing and Alienating
205k322 k. Nature and Form of Remedy.
Most Cited Cases
A suit for alienation of affections does not attempt
to "preserve" or "protect" a marriage from interference, but serves only to compensate a spouse who
has sustained loss and injury to his or her marital
relationship through the intentional interference of
a third party.
[8] Husband and Wife 205 €==>323.1
205 Husband and Wife
205X Enticing and Alienating
205k323 Right of Action
205k323.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 205k323)
Even if some alienation actions are motivated
primarily by spite or extortion, there is no basis on
which to abolish cause of action altogether, since a
plaintiff who institutes a groundless or collusive
suit is subject to a suit or counterclaim for abuse of
process or malicious prosecution, and there can be
no recovery against a defendant whose conduct is
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DAVIS, Judge:
Plaintiffs Lonnie Paulos and Advanced Orthopedics & Sports
Medicine, LLC (Paulos) argue that the trial court abused its
discretion in dismissing this case with prejudice after Paulos's
attorney, Richard S* Nemelka, failed to appear on the first day
Ot the scheduled bench trial, Defendants All My Sons Moving and
Storage, S&B Storage, and John Siddoway argue that dismissal was
a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion,1 We reverse
and remand.

1* Defendants initially argue that we do not have jurisdiction^
to hear this nase due to an untimely appeal. The final orders in
this case were issued January 8, 2008. See generally Promax Dev.
Corp, v, Raile, 2000 UT 4, If 15, 998 P.2d 254 ("[A] trial court
must determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to a party
before the judgment becomes final for the purposes of an appeal
under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3."). Three days later,
Paulos filed a motion for a new trial, which tolls the time for
appeal. See Hume v. Small Claims Court. 590 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah
1979). The district court denied that motion on February 21,
2008, and Paulos filed a notice of appeal on February 29, 20l)b\
Thus, the appeal is timely and we have jurisdiction to hear it.

"It is well established that under Rule 41(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court has the discretion to
dismiss an action with
prejudice for failure to prosecute without
justifiable excuse.'1 Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, 11 28, 46
P.3d 753 (footnote omitted); see also Utah R. civ. P. 41(b) ("For
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these
rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal
of an action or of any claim against hind."). Paulos did not meet
his burden of giving a justifiable excuse for Mr, Nemelka's
failure to appear* Mr. Nemelka was present when the trial date
was rescheduled Lo start November 5, 2007, and he cannot rely on
subsequent pleadings generated by him that simply perpetrated his
mistake, Mr. Nemelka was also aware that there was a discrepancy
between when he thought the trial would start and when opposing
counsel thought the trial would start. This was sufficient to
put Mr. Nemelka on notice and require some action on his part to
directly confirm the correct date with the trial court. Thus,
the trial court had discretion to dismiss the case under rule
41(b).
"However, the trial court's discretion 'must be balanced
against' the priority of 'afford[ing] disputants an opportunity
to be heard and to do justice between them.'" Rohan, 2002 UT App
109, i! 28 (alteration in original) (quoting Maxfield v. Rushton,
779 P*2d 237, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). To deLermine whether
the trial court abused such discretion, we consider five factors:
"(1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the
opportunity each party has had to move the
case forward; (3) what each of the parties
has done to move the case forward; (4) what
difficulty or prejudice may have been caused
to the other side; and (5) most important,
whether injustice may result from the
dismissal."
Id. (quoting Maxfield, 779 P,2d at 239).
Defendants argue that the first three factors support
dismissal because while Defendants were diligently 1 moving the
case forward to trial/ including one of Defendants attorneys
forgoing a trip to avoid further postponing trial, Mr. Nemelka
created several delays. These alleged delays include once
changing the date of depositions due to a scheduling conflict;
later scheduling a hearing to stop those depositions from
occurring; failing to appear at the hearing on the contested
depositions due to a scheduling conflict; delaying a Response Lo
a summary judgment motion based on the depositions; initially
requesting a later trial date because of a conflict with his
personal activities; and failing to appear on the first day of
trial. The majority of these actions are familiar delays in
litigation, and we are not convinced that these actions were
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particularly egregious and show that Paulos "'had ample
opportunity to litigate [his] case . . . but abused such
opportunity.'" gee id. n 32 (quoting Hill v, Dickerson, 839 P.2d
309, 312 <Utah Ct. App. 1992)), Moreover, the trial court, which
did not explain in its initial order why it chose the harsh
sanction of dismissal with prejudice, only mentioned as dilatory
actions that Mr. Nemelka did not appear on the first day of trial
and that the trial had previously been rescheduled at his l
request. Indeed, although the later order denying Paulos s
motion to set aside the dismissal was originally drafted by
Defendants to characterise Mr. Nemelka's actions as "multiple
delays and recklessness in conducting this litigation," the trial
court edited the phrase to simply read "delays in conducting this
litigation,"
As to the fourth factor, Defendants claim that they would
have been prejudiced by postponing trial because they would have
needed to subpoena all of their witnesses again and prepare for
trial a second time. Assuming that three days were required for
the trial, this assertion is true. However, that prejudice could
have been mitigated by holding the bench trial during the two
scheduled days that Mr. Nemelka was prepared to attend, taking
witnesses out of order if necessary, and continuing only one day
of the trial to a later date if that proved necessary.^ And any
monetary cost o£ such a solution could have been reclaimed
through an appropriate award of attorney fees and costs.
Defendants also argue that they would have suffered prejudice
because there is a proceeding in Delaware involving one of
Defendants and that proceeding "depends on the outcome in this
case." But Defendants do no more than allege this as prejudice
and do not explain how the existence of this separate proceeding
would equate to suffering prejudice via a postponement in this
case. It is therefore impossible for us to weigh this claim of
prejudice.
The final and most important factor is the injustice that
may result from dismissal. The injustice to Paulos here is
particularly heavy, leaving him without his day in court and with
no avenue of relief against Defendants. Thus, when combining the
factors, considering the relatively routine nature of most of the
complained of delays, the extent to which the prejudice to
Defendants may have been cured by an appropriate award of
attorney fees and costs, and the severe injustice to Paulos
resulting from a dismissal, wo conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in dismissing Paulos's case with prejudiceThus, we reverse the dismissal and remand for further
proceedings.
Paulos also contests the trial court's award of attorney
fees. When a party fails to appear, the trial court may award
attorney fees under its authority to control proceedings before
it. See Utah Code Ann, § 78A-2-201 (Supp. 2008); Barnard v.
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Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) (B[C]ourts of general
jurisdiction . . . possess certain inherent power to impose
monetary sanctions on attorneys who by their uuuduct thwart the
court's scheduling and movement of cases through the court.").2
Such an award, however, should only be the amount necessary "to
compensate for the delay, inconvenience, and expense resulting
from [the offending lawyer]'s behavior*" Barnard, 855 P.2d at
248; see also Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78, U 14, 985 P.2d

255. We see no authority for the trial court awarding attorney
fees not limited
to those incurred as a result of Mr. Nemelka's
3

nonappearance.

For example, had the case gone to trial and

Defendants prevailed, based upon the pleadings Defendants would
not have been entitled to any attorney fees. Similarly, had we
affirmed the trial court's dismissal with prejudice, thex** would
be no attorney fees awardable as a result of the nonappearance;
indeed, in that scenario, Defendants would have spent less money
defending the suit than if Mr. Nemelka had appeared as scheduled.
But because we reverse the dismissal of the case, Defendants will
have to further defend the case and attorney fees may be awarded
to compensate for those fees and costs resulting directly from
Mr. Nemelka's nonappearance. These fees and costs should be
calculated in light of the fact that trial was scheduled for the

following two days, Mr. Nemelka was prepared to appear on those
two days, and the monetary cost resulting from Mr* Nemelkars
nonappearance could have been mitigated by holding trial those
two days, resulting in lower attorney fees and costs than would
have been incurred by cancelling the trial in its entirety. We
therefore reverse the award of all attorney fees and costs, and
we remand this matter to the trial court for an award of attorney

2m we recognize that the trial court initially categorized its
award of attorney fees as fees awarded because the matter was
without merit. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825(l)
(Supp. 2008) (providing for an award of attorney fees when action
is without merit and not brought in good faith)- However, the
trial court later clarified that no one had alleged that Mr.

Nemelka's nonappearance was in bad faith, that the court nha[d]
made no ruling that [Paulas]'s case is without merit," and that
the fees were awarded pursuant to the trial court'a authority to

control the proceedings before it.
3 * Defendants' attorneys initially requested only attorney fees
"for having to get ready and be here today" and "for trial
preparations „ , - done in the last 48 hours."
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fees and costs limited to those directly resulting from Mr,
Nemelka's nonappearance on the first day of trial.4

James Z, Davis, Judge

WE CONCUR:

William A. Thorne Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge

Gregory K- Orme, Judge

4*

Defendants' cursory request for attorney fees based on

Pauloe's alleged inadequate briefing is denied.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
Joseph W. ROHAN, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Chad BOSEMAN, a minor; and Jerald Boseman, an
individual, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20001148-CA.

[2] Appeal and Error 30 €=^842(1)

April 11,2002.
Rehearing Denied May 6, 2002.
Automobile accident victim appealed from order of
the District Court, Third District, Salt Lake Department, J. Dennis Frederick, J., dismissing his negligence action with prejudice and awarding costs and
fees to defendants. The Court of Appeals, Billings,
Associate P.J., held that: (1) trial court acted within
its discretion in denying automobile accident victim's request for a continuance; (2) trial court did
not exceed its discretion in denying automobile accident victim's motions for a voluntary dismissal;
(3) trial court's denial of automobile accident victim's motions did not violate Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); (4) trial court did not exceed
its discretion in dismissing automobile accident victim's action with prejudice; (5) accident victim's
motions were frivolous and without basis in law or
fact; and (6) sufficient evidence supported trial
court's finding that automobile accident victim acted in bad faith.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €^>962
30 Appeal and Error
3 OXVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k962 k. Dismissal or Nonsuit Before
Trial. Most Cited Cases
Appellate court reviews trial court's dismissal with
prejudice for failure to prosecute for abuse of dis-

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Appellate court reviews questions of law for correctness.
[31 Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 8 4 2 ( 1 )
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30X VT(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question
of law that appellate court reviews for correctness.
[4] Pretrial Procedure 307A €^>716
307A Pretrial Procedure
307AIV Continuance
307Ak716 k. Absence, Death, or Disability
of Counsel. Most Cited Cases
Trial court acted within its discretion in denying
automobile accident victim's request for a continuance so that new counsel could prepare for trial in
negligence action, where victim was also an attorney, was aware of his brain injury, and waited until
18 days before trial, and four months after court put
him on notice that he must prosecute his case, before requesting a continuance and to formally substitute counsel.
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[5] Pretrial Procedure 307A €^>506.1
307A Pretrial Procedure
307AI1I Dismissal
307AI1I( A) Voluntary Dismissal
307Ak506 Time for Dismissal; Condition
of Cause
307Ak506.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Trial court did not exceed its discretion in denying
automobile accident victim's motions for a voluntary dismissal of negligence action, where motion
was made two weeks before trial, accident victim
had voluntarily discharged counsel just prior to trial, and defendants had incurred expenses in preparing for trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 41.
[6] Civil Rights 78 €^>1056
78 Civil Rights
781 Rights Protected and Discrimination Prohibited in General
78k 1056 k. Courts and Judicial Proceedings.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78kl 16, 78kl07(l))
Trial court's denial of automobile accident victim's
motions for continuance or voluntary dismissal did
not violate Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA);
even though accident victim, who was also an attorney, suffered a closed brain injury, trial court's
denial of motions were occasioned not by accident
victim's disability, but by his refusing to prosecute
his case in a timely manner through his counsel of
record and as a sanction for his dilatory conduct.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 2 et
seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.
[7] Appeal and Error 30 €^>1079
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVT(K) Error Waived in Appellate Court
30kl079 k. Insufficient Discussion of Objections. Most Cited Cases
Appellate court declined to consider automobile accident victim's claims that trial court's denial of his
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motions for a continuance or voluntary dismissal
violated his right to due process and equal protection under the United States Constitution and right
to due process, uniform operation of laws, and access to the courts under the state constitution; because accident victim's brief failed to adequately set
forth an argument. U.S.CA. Const.Amends. 5, 14;
Const. Art. 1, §§ 7, 11; Rules App.Proc, Rule
24(a)(9).
|8] Pretrial Procedure 307A €=>583
307A Pretrial Procedure
307ATII Dismissal
307AITI(B) Involuntary Dismissal
307ATII(B)3 Want of Prosecution
307Ak583 k. Power and Discretion of
Court in General. Most Cited Cases
Under rule governing dismissal of actions, a trial
court has the discretion to dismiss an action with
prejudice for failure to prosecute without justifiable
excuse; this discretion must be balanced against the
priority of affording disputants an opportunity to be
heard and to do justice between them. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 41(b).
[9] Pretrial Procedure 307A €^>683
307A Pretrial Procedure
307AIII Dismissal
307AI11(B) Involuntary Dismissal
307AI1I(B)6 Proceedings and Effect
307Ak682 Evidence
307Ak683 k. Piesumptions and
Burden of Proof. Most Cited Cases
Party challenging dismissal for failure to prosecute
bears the burden of offering a reasonable excuse for
his or her lack of diligence. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
41(b).
[10] Appeal and Error 30 €=>863
30 Appeal and Error
3OXVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
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30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Appellate court considers the following factors in
determining whether a trial court exceeded its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute: (1)
the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each
party has had to move the case forward; (3) what
each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4) what difficulty or prejudice may have
been caused to the other side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may result from the dismissal.
[11] Pretrial Procedure 307A €=^583
307A Pretrial Procedure
307AIIJ Dismissal
307A1TT(B) Involuntary Dismissal
307A1II(B)3 Want of Prosecution
307Ak583 k. Power and Discretion of
Court in General. Most Cited Cases
Even where a trial court finds facts indicating that
injustice could result from the dismissal of a case
for failure to prosecute, it can dismiss when a
plaintiff has had more than ample opportunity to
prove his or her asserted interest and simply failed
to do so. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 41(b).
f 12] Pretrial Procedure 307A €^>587
307A Pretrial Procedure
307AIII Dismissal
307AI11(B) Involuntary Dismissal
307A1II(B)3 Want of Prosecution
307Ak587 k. Particular Applications,
Delay or Time Limitation. Most Cited Cases
Pretrial Procedure 307A €=>690
3 07 A Pretrial Procedure
307AIII Dismissal
307AIII(B) Involuntary Dismissal
307AIII(B)6 Proceedings and Effect
307Ak690 k. Dismissal with or

Without Prejudice. Most Cited Cases
Trial court did not exceed its discretion in dismissing automobile accident victim's action with prejudice for failure to prosecute; accident victim, who
was an attorney, had ample opportunity to litigate
but abused his opportunity when he represented that
he was ready for trial and then later dismissed
counsel and sought more experienced counsel within weeks of trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 41(b).
[13] Costs 102 €==>194.16
102 Costs
102VIII Attorney Fees
102k 194.16 k. American Rule; Necessity of
Contractual or Statutory Authorization or Grounds
in Equity. Most Cited Cases
Ordinarily attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by a statutory or contractual provision.
[14] Appeal and Error 30 €=>766
30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k766 k. Defects, Objections, and Amendments. Most Cited Cases
Appellate court could assume that record supported
trial court's findings, upon which its award of attorney fees were based, that automobile accident victim acted in bad faith and was dilatory in automobile accident action, because accident victim
failed meet requirement to marshal the evidence,
citing the appellate court to all the evidence supporting trial court's ruling.
[15] Costs 102 €=^194.44
102 Costs
102VIII Attorney Fees
102kl94.44 k. Bad Faith or Meritless Litigation. Most Cited Cases
Automobile accident victim's motions, filed day before trial, for continuance or voluntary dismissal
based on claim that he was entitled to motions under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) due to
head injury, were frivolous and without basis in law
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or fact, and thus supported an award of attorney
fees. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 2
et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.; U.C.A.1953,
78-27-56.
[16] Costs 102 €^>194.44
102 Costs
102VIIT Attorney Fees
] 02k 194.44 k. Bad Faith or Meritless Litigation. Most Cited Cases
In regards to an award of attorney fees, to find that
a party acted without good faith, the trial court is
required to find that he: (1) lacked an honest belief
in the propriety of the activities in question; or (2)
intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) intended to or acted with the knowledge
that the activities in question would hinder, delay,
or defraud others. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-56.
[17] Costs 102 €^>207
102 Costs
102IX Taxation
102k207 k. Evidence as to Items. Most Cited
Cases
Sufficient evidence supported trial court's finding
that automobile accident victim acted in bad faith in
his negligence action, as necessary to support an
award of attorney fees, where accident victim indicated that he was ready for trial, then later dismissed
counsel and sought more experienced counsel within weeks of trial, and, appearing pro se, appeared
for trial without witnesses and unprepared to proceed. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-56.
*754 Joseph W. Rohan, Halliday & Watkins, PC,
Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se.
*755 Mark S. Gustavson, Sandy, and Robert L.
Jeffs and Rodney W. Rivers, Jeffs & Jeffs, Provo,
for Appellees.

Before JACKSON, P.J., and BILLINGS, Associate
P.J. and DAVIS, J.

OPINION
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
^ 1 Joseph W. Rohan (Rohan) appeals the trial
court's dismissal of his negligence action and award
of attorney fees and costs to Chad and Gerald Boseman (the Bosemans). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
H 2 In January 1997, Rohan suffered head injuries
in a vehicular accident involving Chad Boseman. In
April 1997, Rohan learned he had a closed brain injury.
K 3 Following the accident, Rohan, a licensed Utah
attorney, continued to practice law with Halliday &
Watkins, P.C. In early 1998, Rohan retained Halliday & Watkins to represent him in a negligence action against the Bosemans. On April 23, 1998, Rohan, through Halliday & Watkins, filed a complaint. Thereafter, the parties proceeded to conduct
settlement negotiations and discovery. In an August
1999 letter, Rohan, through Halliday & Watkins,
informed the Bosemans that he intended to terminate settlement negotiations and proceed to trial.
K 4 On October 28, 1999, a year and a half after Rohan's complaint was filed, the trial court issued an
order to show cause as to why Rohan's action
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Following a hearing in Novembei 1999, the trial
court continued the order to show cause for sixty
days.
H 5 On January 19, 2000, Rohan, through Halliday
& Watkins, filed a certificate of readiness for trial.
The Bosemans objected arguing, inter alia, that Rohan had failed to provide documents requested in
discovery, and consequently, they had been unable
to complete Rohan's deposition. They requested
120 days to complete discovery.
| 6 In a conference on March 2, 2000, the trial
court scheduled a final pretrial conference for June
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5 and trial for June 20-23, 2000. The court ordered
the parties to complete discovery by May 26, 2000.
If 7 After the scheduling conference, the Bosemans
filed a motion to compel production of the documents they had previously requested from Rohan.
The motion was granted. Later in March, both
parties designated trial witnesses and exhibits. Rohan's designations were through Halliday &
Watkins and included medical experts.
t 8 Sometime in March 2000, Rohan concluded that
Halliday & Watkins lacked the experience to try his
case. Thus, he retained Robert Orton (Orton) of Fabian & Clendenin, P.C. In March and April, Orton
attended supplemental depositions; in May, he examined medical records at the office of the Bosemans' counsel. However, Orton never filed a formal
appearance in Rohan's action.
If 9 A week before the final pretrial conference, Orton informed Rohan that he could not depose experts in time for trial and he would not represent
Rohan without a continuance. Thus, on June 2,
2000, Rohan filed a pro se motion to continue trial
for ninety days and to extend discovery for sixty
days so that Orton could "identify supplemental expert and fact witnesses," "conduct further discovery," and prepare for trial. In the motion, Rohan
also sought the withdrawal of Holliday & Watkins
and to substitute Orton as counsel.
If 10 At the final pretrial conference on June 5,
2000, Halliday & Watkins appeared on Rohan's behalf. The trial court took Rohan's motion to continue under advisement, but instructed the parties and
counsel to prepare for trial. Later that day, the court
denied the continuance because Rohan had failed to
establish good cause as required by Utah law and
FN1
because, under the circumstances, fifteen days
before trial was too late to substitute counsel.
FN1. The motion to continue and substitute counsel was actually filed eighteen
days before trial.
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f 11 On June 6, 2000, Rohan filed a pro se notice of
discharge and discharged Halliday & Watkins. The
next day, he filed a pro se motion for a voluntary
dismissal, arguing he *756 lacked counsel and it
would be manifestly unfair to require him to try his
own brain injury case. The Bosemans opposed the
motion arguing, inter alia, Rohan voluntarily discharged his counsel, he could not claim surprise
with respect to his counsels' lack of experience, and
they would suffer prejudice if Rohan's motion were
granted. The trial court summarily denied the motion for the reasons specified in the Bosemans' objection.
t 12 On June 15, 2000, Rohan filed a notice of inability to bring his case to trial. The Bosemans responded that unless otherwise informed by the
court, they would continue to prepare for trial. On
June 19, 2000, the day before trial, Rohan filed a
renewed motion for a continuance and voluntary
dismissal, arguing the trial court's refusal to grant
the renewed motion would violate the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA).
^ 13 Rohan appeared pro se at trial. At the outset,
the court denied the renewed motion, concluding
Rohan's assertion that the ADA required the court
to grant a continuance or voluntary dismissal was
without basis in law and fact. Rohan informed the
court that he did not have any witnesses and was
not prepared to proceed. Consequently, the Bosemans made a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The trial court granted
the motion and awarded the Bosemans' attorney
fees and costs incurred as a result of Rohan's
"willful failure or refusal" to proceed with trial.
Tf 14 On August 7, 2000, Rohan filed a pro se motion for a new trial, primarily asserting the dismissal with prejudice violated the ADA, but also
asserting the dismissal violated the United States
and Utah Constitutions. The trial court denied the
motion. Rohan appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
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[1] f 15 Rohan argues the trial court erred in denying his motions for a continuance and voluntary
dismissal and in dismissing his case with prejudice
for failure to prosecute. We review these actions of
the trial court for abuse of discretion. See Brown v.
Glover. 2000 UT 89,1 43, 16 P.3d 540; Harmon v
Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639-40 (Utah 1979);
Maxfleld v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah
Ct.App.1989).
[2] H 16 Rohan also argues he was entitled to a continuance or dismissal without prejudice under the
ADA. He additionally argues the denial of his motions violates his right to due process and equal
protection under the United States and Utah Constitutions. These issues present questions of law that
we review for correctness. See, e.g., State v Mast,
2001 UT App 40241 7-8, 40 P.3d 1143.
[3] If 17 Finally, Rohan argues the trial court erred
in awarding attorney fees and costs to the Bosemans. Whether attorney fees are recoverable in the
present case is a question of law that we review for
correctness. See, e.g., Warner v. DMG Color, Inc.,
2000 UT 1024 21, 20 P.3d 868.

ANALYSIS
I. Did the Trial Court Exceed Its Discretion in
Denying Rohan's Motions for a Continuance and
Voluntary Dismissal?
If 18 Rohan first argues the trial court exceeded its
discretion in denying his initial motion for a continuance. In relevant part, Rule 40 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "the court
may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may
be just, ... postpone a trial ... upon good cause
shown." Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b).
[4] Tf 19 We conclude the trial court acted within its
discretion in denying Rohan's initial motion for a
continuance, which was based solely upon his desire for more experienced counsel. Rohan was
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aware that he had a brain injury from the outset, yet
he proceeded through his firm, Halliday & Watkins,
for more than two years. Then, in March 2000, he
concluded he needed more experienced counsel. In
November 1999, the trial court put Rohan on notice
that he must prosecute his case. This is when Rohan
should have decided who would represent him. Instead, Rohan waited until eighteen days before trial,
over two years after he filed his complaint, to request a continuance and to formally substitute
counsel. Rohan has not offered a reasonable explanation for *757 his dilatory conduct. Under
these circumstances, we cannot sa> the trial court
exceeded its discretion in denying a continuance.
Cf. Hardy v. Hardy, 116 P.2d 917, 926 (Utah
Ct.App.1989) (concluding trial court did not act unreasonably in denying continuance where prosecution of case had been substantially delayed by failure to agree upon expert witnesses and retain new
counsel).
[5] f 20 Rohan next argues the trial court exceeded
its discretion in denying his renewed motion for a
continuance and motions for a voluntary dismissal
because it is manifestly unjust to force a party with
a brain injury to try his own case. In relevant part,
Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "an action may only be dismissed at
the request of the plaintiff on order of the court
based either on: (i) a stipulation of all of the parties
who have appeared in the action; or (ii) upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper."
UtahR. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
If 21 In assessing whether the trial court exceeded
its discretion, Rohan contends we should adopt the
analysis of the Tenth Circuit. In the Tenth Circuit,
"[ajbsent 'legal prejudice' to the defendant, the
[trial] court normally should grant such a dismissal." Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537
(10th Cir.1997). "[Relevant factors the [trial] court
should consider include: the opposing party's effort
and expense in preparing for trial; excessive delay
and lack of diligence on the part of the movant; insufficient explanation of the need for a dismissal;
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c
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dennis V. SPENCER and Linda S. Spencer,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
PLEASANT VIEW CITY, a Utah municipality;
Cherrywood Manor, Inc., a Utah corporation;
Cherrywood Manor Home Owners Association,
Inc., a Utah corporation; and John and Jane Does IXX, individual defendants in their private capacities, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20010927-CA.
Nov. 6,2003.
Landowners denied request for approval of a subdivision and building permits sued city, alleging
slander of title and various state and federal constitutional violations. The Second District Court, Ogden Department, W. Brent West, J., granted summary judgment for city, and landowners appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Billings, A.P.J., held that:
(1) landowners were not the prevailing party, for
purposes of attorney fees, as a result of city's offer
to issue building permits after commencement of
action; (2) landowners did not have a protected
property interest for due process purposes as a result of variances issued 10 years earlier; and (3)
landowners did not have a slander of title claim
against city.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Civil Rights 78 €^>1482
78 Civil Rights
78III Federal Remedies in General
78kl477 Attorney Fees
78kl482 k. Results of Litigation; Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases
Landowners were not "prevailing parties" on their
federal constitutional claims for equitable relief in

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West.
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action against city, for purposes of an attorney fee
award under statute allowing such fees on section
1983 claims; though landowners had claimed city
violated Constitution by failing to issue building
permits, city offered to issue building permits after
landowners sued city, and trial court found the offer
rendered landowners' claims moot, trial court did
not approve, adopt or ratify city's offer in any official manner, and city's change in conduct lacked the
necessary judicial imprimatur. 42 U.S.C.A. §§
1983,1988.
[21 Civil Rights 78 €=>1482
78 Civil Rights
78TIT Federal Remedies in General
78kl477 Attorney Fees
78k 1482 k. Results of Litigation; Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases
Attorney fees may be claimed by a party in a section 1983 action under the theory that the party succeeded on a non-federal claim pendent to a substantial constitutional claim and which arises from a
common nucleus of operative fact. 42 U.S.C.A. §§
1983, 1988.
[3] Civil Rights 78 € ^ 1 4 8 2
78 Civil Rights
781II Federal Remedies in General
78kl477 Attorney Fees
78kl482 k. Results of Litigation; Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases
A party can "prevail" for purposes of statute allowing attorney fees on constitutional claims under
section 1983 only where there is a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the
parties, as with enforceable judgments on the merits
and court-ordered consent decrees. 42 U.S.C.A. §
1988.
[4] Civil Rights 78 € ^ 1 4 8 2
78 Civil Rights
78III Federal Remedies in General
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involves some claim that the [municipality] exceeded, abused or 'distorted' its legal authority in
some manner, often for some allegedly perverse
(from the developer's point of view) reason. It is
not enough simply to give these state law claims
constitutional labels such as 'due process' or
'equal protection' in order to raise a substantial
federal question under section 1983."
Id. at If 25 (quoting Creative Environments, Inc v.
Estabrook. 680 F 2d 822, 833 (1st Cir.1982)). Additionally, "absent invidious discrimination, such as
proof of racial animus, the 'conventional planning
dispute ... is a matter primarily of concern to the
state and does not implicate the Constitution.' " Id.
(quoting Creative Environments. Inc., 680 F.2d at
833).
[10] f 18 The Spencers have not alleged invidious
discrimination by the City. Rather, the Spencers argue their original variances warrant federal protection in that "[variances run with the land,"Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4) (1998), and are not subject to revocation. This argument is merely a "
'conventional planning dispute.' " Patterson. 2003
UT 7 at \ 25 (quoting Creative Environments, Inc.,
680 F.2d at 833). Further, the Spencers have not
identified a protected property interest to which
they are entitled. While the Spencers and the Parkers obtained variances to build on their properties,
neither sought to build until nearly ten years after
the variances were granted. We have "uncovered no
authority that suggests a property owner has a vested property right in a contemplated development or
subdivision." Marshall v Board of County
Comm'rs, 912 F.Supp. 1456, 1464 (D.Wyo.1996).
Moreover, the Spencers' argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would allow property owners who
fail to act for many years on a granted variance to
frustrate a city's ability to update its land use regulations.
^f 19 The Spencers' case "involves disputes about
specific local development issues, not about the
deprivation of constitutional rights." Patterson,
2003 UT 7 at | 28. "Whatever unfairness [the Spen-
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cers] may have experienced, nothing in the facts
presented sounds constitutional alarm bells." Id. at
FN7
If 28.
Thus, we conclude the Spencers failed to
establish a property interest protected under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore the trial court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of the City.
FN 7. We limit our holding to the specific
facts of this case. We cannot say there will
never be a case in which an adverse municipal land use decision against a developer
rises to the level of a constitutional violation. However, the facts of this case do not
warrant constitutional protection.
III. Federal Takings Claim Inadequately Briefed
[11][12][13] 1 20 The Spencers' federal takings
claim is inadequately briefed, and we refuse to consider it. "It is well established that a reviewing
court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,
305 (Utah 1998).
In deciding whether an argument has been adequately briefed, we look to ...*552rule 24(a)(9)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure^
which] states that the argument in the appellant's
brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented ... with citations to the authorities, statutes
and parts of the record relied on.'" Implicitly, rule
24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and
reasoned analysis based on that authority....
[T]his court is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument
and research.
Id. at 305 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
If 21 Incorrectly labeling their claim as "substantive
due process," the Spencers inadequately assert a
federal "taking" without just compensation. In cursory fashion, the Spencers argue that a platting error
by the City, regarding a right-of-way owned by the
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Spencers limiting use of that right-of-way, involved
a private rather than public use. Aside from a one
sentence quotation to a 1937 takings case, the Spencers cite no case law describing or supporting their
claim. There is no reasoned analysis or factual development supporting any legal claim for damages,
thus "dump[ing] the burden of argument and research" on this court. Id. (quotations and citation
omitted). Similarly, the Spencers claim the City's
"actions were not related to [its] rationale proffered
for conduct." However, the Spencers make no mention of damages or constitutional remedies. The
Spencers reference several instances of the City's
conduct regarding the Spencers' development attempts without any meaningful discussion of these
facts or reasoned analysis as to why the City's conduct amounts to a constitutional taking. Citing one
regulatory takings case, the Spencers superficially
claim the facts are similar to this case, with no further analysis or mention of the elements of a regulatory takings. Therefore, the federal takings claim
fails.
FN 8. The Spencers' cursory and conclusory arguments that the City violated Article 1, Section 7; Article 1, Section 22; and
Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution also fail for inadequate briefing.
IV. Slander of Title
f 22 The Spencers argue that their slander of title
claim against the City should have survived summary judgment. The trial court dismissed this claim
because, inter alia, the Spencers failed to establish a
"factual or legal basis" for their assertions. The
Spencers do not argue a cognizable claim on appeal, and we therefore affirm the trial court's ruling.

v. Banbeny Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1256-57
(Utah 1989). In their brief, the Spencers refer to
"collective city statements" that "denigrated the
validity of Spencers' real property," but do not
provide any details about those statements or how
they satisfy the first element. For the second element, the Spencers assert in conclusory fashion that
the City's statements "were false." In asserting
malice, the Spencers cite the standard but do not
apply it to the facts, arguing only that, "taken in
context," the statements were malicious. The Spencers also inadequately argue special damages. Thus,
the Spencers' slander of title claim fails.

CONCLUSION
\ 24 We conclude the Spencers are not entitled to
"prevailing party" attorney fees. Further, the Spencers fail to articulate any legitimate constitutional
claims against the City. The Spencers' slander of
title claim also fails. Therefore, we affirm.
1 25 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Presiding Judge and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR.,
Judge.
UtahApp.,2003.
Spencer v. Pleasant View City
80 P.3d 546, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 2003 UT App
379
END OF DOCUMENT

[14][15] U 23"To prove slander of title, a claimant
must [show] that (1) there was a publication of a
slanderous statement disparaging [the] claimant's
title, (2) the statement was false, (3) the statement
was made with malice, and (4) the statement caused
actual or special damages." First Sec. Bank of Utah

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Westlaw.
Page 1

853 P.2d851
853P.2d851
(Cite as: 853 P.2d 851)

[2] Searches and Seizures 349 € ^ 1 7 4
Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Donald Wayne BROWN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 900148.
Nov. 30, 1992.
Rehearing Denied June 17, 1993.
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Box
Elder County, Franklin L. Gunnell, J., of second-degree murder and aggravated assault. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that:
(1) business owner had authority to consent to
search of trailer used to house defendant; (2) appointment of part-time prosecutor as defense counsel warranted new trial; (3) admission of prior bad
acts evidence was not plain error; and (4) evidence
was sufficient to support conviction for aggravated
assault.
Reversed and remanded.
Stewart, J., concurred with opinion.
Hall, C.J., dissented with opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law 110 €=^1030(1)
110 Criminal Law
1 10XXIV Review
]1 0XX1V(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
n0XXIV(E)l In General
110k 1030 Necessity of Objections in
General
110k 103 0(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Supreme Court uses plain error standard to review
issues raised for first time on appeal.

349 Searches and Seizures
349 V Waiver and Consent
349kl73 Persons Giving Consent
349kl74 k. Owners of Property; Hosts
and Guests. Most Cited Cases
Business owner had authority to consent to search
of trailer used to house defendant; trailer had
"common area" used by all employees of business,
owner had unrestricted right of access to at least
common area in trailer, all items seized were in
plain sight, none were hidden and none were in area
in sole possession of defendant. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amcnd. 4.
[3] Criminal Law 110 € ^ 1 1 3 0 ( 6 )
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(I) Briefs
HOkl 130 In General
1 lOkl 130(6) k. Reply Briefs. Most
Cited Cases
Defendant's failure to include state constitutional
analysis in his opening brief (and state's subsequent
failure to include such analysis in its response
brief) precluded review of state constitutional analysis added to defendant's response brief; otherwise,
state would be placed in difficult position in future
cases of either missing opportunity to brief state
constitutional law issue or having to construct and
then rebut an unbriefed issue.
[4] Searches and Seizures 349 C ^ 2 4
349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k24 k. Necessity of and Preference for
Warrant, and Exceptions in General. Most Cited
Cases
Warrantless searches are per se um'easonable unless
undertaken pursuant to recognized exception to
warrant requirement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
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This amended opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00——

State o£ Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

AMENDED OPINION1
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 20071003-CA

v.

F I L E D
(May 7, 2009)

Wolfgango Ruiz,
Defendant and Appellant,

2009 UT A P P 121

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 051906181
The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy
Attorneys:

Hakeem Ishola, West Valley City, for Appellant
Mark L» Shurtleff and Laura B- Dupaix, Salt Lake
city, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
HI
Wolfgango Ruiz timely sought to withdraw his guilty plea.
His motion was granted. On reconsideration by a different judge,
that disposition was rescinded and the motion was denied. W^
reverse that denial.

1. This Amended Opinion replaces our Opinion issued on December
26, 2008, see State v. Ruiz, 2008 UT App 470, 620 Utah Adv. Rep,
41. We address the State's arguments raised in its petition for
rehearing, see infra !1F 16-23/ and decline to delete the language
to which the State takes exception for the reasons outlined in
the final section of this opinion.fif-Qffl-.ah"R. App. p. ?5fc)
("If a petition for rehearing is granted, the court may make a
final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may restore
j.t to the caienaar tor rearguift&flt ar resuomxssionr or m^y make""*
"such_other. orders as are deemed appropriate
under the
circumstances __of the particular caJ5'ST;Tr» ASlfife from -chis ~
explanatory footnote, our opinion resolving this appeal remains
exactly the same except for the addition of the section entitled
"On Petition for Rehearing."

v^l

G&
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Chris Wall and Tara Wall,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For O f f i c i a l P u b l i c a t i o n )

Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.

C a s e NO*

20080758-CA

F I L E D
(May 1 4 , 2 0 0 9 )

Tamer a Palmer,
2009 UT App 129i
Defendant and Appellant,

Fourth District, Nephi Department, 080600135
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre Jr.
Attorneys:

Tamera Palmer, Nephi, Appellant Pro Se
Chris Wall and Tara Wall, Payson, Appellees Pro Se

Before Judges Thorne, Bench, and Orme*
PER CURIAM:
Tamera Palmer appeals the district court's August 26, 2008
judgment. We affirm*
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires,, among other things, that all appellate brief3 submitted
contain a table of contents, a table of authoritiesr a statement
of jurisdiction, a statement of the issues presented for appeal,
including the, standard of^appellate review with supporting
authority, and proper citations to the record. See Utah R, App.
P- 24(a), Rule 24(a)(9) also requires that all appellate briefs
contain prope.i^Xftynl apaiysijj with cxtations to relev^t legal—
authority supporting the" a-rqfcrrftjifp T-PM*#*H ^hor^-ir.
Q,aQ id. R.
24(a)(9).
An appellate ^ourt is nbt a depository in which parties may
dump the burden of their argument and research* See Smith v.
Four Corners Mental Health Cfcr., i n c . 2003 UT 23, 11 46, 70 P.3d
904. The appellant, in his br her brief, bears the burden o£
demonstrating wxtn"appropriate legal argument that the district
court erred,.. See State v. Pkrice. 827 P.2d 2*47. 250 /Utah ct.
App. 1992). This court may decline to consider the merits of an "*>
appeal if a P ^ t y falls to cite relevant JLegal authority and also £ ^ f f ails_toprb^jLdQ~meaiii.ncrful legal analvaia pertaining to the

*

J

facts of his or her case. See State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App
305, H 25, 989 P.2d 503. A^hough^Utak appellate courts are
reluctant _to penalize self-::t;e^e3entedlitigaats foiFtechnical
Tule^vlolatior^^
as"sume~a party[s burden of
^arg{ffle5g^^
fi^
AlienorFriel, ^UOB irr~5T7~T~9T194
.Thi^ c g^£t notified Palmer of -the briefing requirements.

$

Despite this court's request that Palmer comply wit^thebrief ing
requirements/ "Palmer_declined to file a proper brief. , Palmer' S~~
brief raises seven issues. However, her argument section.is
limited to six paragraphs which do not pertain to the legal
issues that she raises on appeal or satisfy her burden of
convincing this court that the underlying court erred. Palmer's
brief fails to raise any legal argument, which if well-taken,
would entitle her to reversal of the district court's judgment.
Accordingly, the* district court's August 26, 2008 judgment
is affirmed.

William A. Thorne Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge

Russell W, Bench, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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